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ABSTRACT
Three Theories of Events
Edward

R.

Wierenga

University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Director:

Gareth B. Matthews

August, 1974

This dissertation is an examination of the theories of
events proposed by Jaegwon Kim, Donald Davidson, and Roderick
Chisholm.
In the first chapter

I

consider Kim's view that an event

is the having of an n-adic property by an n-ary sequence of

objects at a time.

I

show how Kim can coherently reply to a

familiar trivialization argument whose conclusion is that
there is only one event.

I

argue that Kim's view is vague

in certain crucial respects and that it involves an objectiona-

ble brand of essentialism.

Since Davidson attempts to support his theory of events
by appeal to his analysis of the logical form of action

sentences,
II

I

I

devote two chapters to that analysis.

In Chapter

state Davidson's view that action sentences are ex-

istential quantifications over events and that many adverbial

modifiers are predicates of events.

I

show how Davidson's

theory can avoid an objection of Fodor's that it cannot ac

commodate those modifiers that function both as sentential

modifiers and verbal modifiers.

In Chapter III

I

claim that

V

Davidson’s account of action sentences is defective because
it cannot handle certain cases in which an agent does two

things at once.

I

consider a revision of Davidson's theory

designed to avoid this objection, but conclude for similar
reasons that the revision is also defective.
In Chapter IV

I

consider Davidson's theory of events.

There are two important features of his theory:

events are

concrete particulars and they are extremely coarsely individuated.

I

consider mainly the second.

claim that

I

neither the positive support he provides for his theory

,

nor

the identity condition he gives for events, nor his account

of action sentences requires that events are coarsely in-

dividuated.

I

consider an objection to Davidson, urged by

occur
Goldman, that certain events which Davidson identifies
at different times, but
I

I

find the objection inconclusive.

consider another objection that events which Davidson

more
identifies occur at different places, and find it

persuasive.

I

also note that Davidson's view of events is

like 'He
incompatible with a natural treatment of sentences

opened the window by turning the crank’.
appendix,

I

Finally, in an

his talk
criticize Davidson's attempt to explain

of actions "under a description".
In the fifth chapter

I

examine Chisholm's view that

events are a species of states of affairs.

I

consider some

I claim,
reply.
objections to which Chisholm is able to
not do justice to our
however, that Chisholm's theory does

VI

ordinary notion of event, and, in particular, he has given
no method for counting events.

Moreover, although he has

given a theory which allows for events that occur at some
times and which fail to occur at others, he seems to ignore
the possibility that an event may occur at some place while

failing to occur at another.

This possibility is exploited

to reveal an ambiguity in Chisholm's primitive locution,
'pBc^',

read

'jd

occurs before

begins'.

A similar considera-

tion reveals a defect in a series of definitions by which

Chisholm tried to reduce talk of particular occurrences of
events to talk only of the occurrence and non-occurrence of
his generic events.
In a brief conclusion

I

review some motivations which

have led philosophers to suppose that there are events,
and

I

list some problems which an adequate theory of events

ought to solve.

I

conclude that none of the three theories

examined is acceptable.

Vll

PREFACE
This dissertation is an examination of the theories of

events proposed by Jaegwon Kim, Donald Davidson, and Roderick
These theories were not chosen because they are

Chisholm.

On the

the only currently available theories of events.

contrary, there are several alternatives

1
.

Rather, these

theories were chosen because they interested me and because,
in virtue of their differences

,

they represent a wide

variety of alternatives
There is a pair of distinctions made with respect to
events.

First, events might be thought to be concrete

particulars or they might be thought to be some sort of
abstract entities.

Secondly, some philosophers argue

that events are very finely individuated, while others

conceive of events as very coarsely individuated.

2

The

three theories to be considered cut across this pair of

distinctions in an interesting way.

According to Kim

events are particular and finely individuated.

According

individuated.
to Davidson events are particular but coarsely

And according to Chisholm they are abstract

and finely

individuated
In the first chapter

events.

I

I

shall discuss Kim's theory of

an
shall first state and develop his view that

an n-ary
event is the having of an n-adic property by
shall consider a
sequence of objects at a time. Next, I

anyone who accepts,
claim made by F. Robert Bohl, Jr., that

Vlll
as Kim does, that sentences refer to or describe events
is committed to the premisses of an argument whose con-

clusion is that there is only one event.

I

shall claim

that Kim can coherently reject some of the premisses of
this trivialization argument.

Finally,

some criticisms of Kim's theory.

I

is vague in certain crucial respects

shall offer

I

shall claim that it
,

that it leaves

several important questions unanswered.

I

shall also

claim that Kim's view might involve an objectionable
brand of essentialism.

It seems to be his view, for

example, that an event cannot occur at any time other
than the time at which it does occur.
Since Davidson attempts to support his theory of

events by appealing to his analysis of the logical form
of action sentences

,

I

shall devote two chapters to that

In Chapter II

analysis.

I

shall present Davidson's view

that sentences like
(1)

Boris strolled in Bologna

that
are existential generalizations over events, and

predicates
many adverbial phrases, like 'in Bologna' are
of events.

I

shall consider an objection due to Fodor

modifiers that
that this account cannot handle adverbial
verbal modifiers,
function both as sentential modifiers and
and

I

objection.
shall show how Davidson can meet this
In Chapter III

I

shall claim that Davidson's treat-

for certain cases
ment of action sentences cannot account
I shall consider
at once.
in which an agent does two things

IX
a revision of Davidson's theory designed to avoid this

objection, but

shall conclude that similar considerations

I

show the revision to be inadequate.
In the fourth chapter

theory of events.

I

shall consider Davidson's

As noted above, there are two salient

features of Davidson's theory of events.
that events are particular.

First, he thinks

Secondly, he thinks that

events are coarsely individuated, that, for example, an
agent's flipping a light switch might be the same event
as his illuminating the room.

shall be mainly concerned

I

'

with this second feature of Davidson's theory of events.

And

I

4

shall argue, first, that it is not supported by the

considerations Davidson adduces in its favor.

fine-grained event individuation

,

I

shall argue

Moreover,
,

is not

supported either by Davidson's account of action sentences
or by the identity condition he gives for events
I

shall also consider some objections to Davidson's

theory of events.

The first, due to Goldman, is that

difcertain events which Davidson identifies occur at

ferent times.

While

I

am sympathetic to this objection,

alternative
shall conclude that the unattractiveness of
of the events
attempts to fix the time of the occurrence
unpersuasive. Another
in question makes the objection
events which
objection that I shall consider is that some
I shall
places.
Davidson identifies occur at different
I

events is incompatible
also note that Davidson's view of

X

with a natural treatment of sentences like,
the window by turning the crank'.
to the fourth chapter,

I

'He

opened

Finally, in an appendix

shall criticize Davidson's attempt
"under a description".

to explain his talk of actions

In Chapter V I shall discuss Chisholm’s theory that

A state of

events are a species of states of affairs.

affairs, for Chisholm, is anything capable of being the

object of a propositional attitude.

An event is a state

of affairs that can recur, that is, it can occur and then

Chisholm thinks that we

occur again after not occuring.

can reduce talk of particular occurences of events to

talk only of the occurrence or non-occurrence of his

generic events

.

I

shall claim that Chisholm fails to do

Chisholm's

justice to our ordinary concept of event.

theory is designed to accommodate events which occur at
some times and fail to occur at others.

I

shall note that

his events might occur at one place while failing to occur
at some other place.

I

shall exploit this possibility to

point out an ambiguity in his primitive locution 'pBq'
read

’p

occurs before q begins

'

.

The same possibility

which
will be used to show that a series of definitions by

Chisholm hopes to accomplish the reduction of talk about
particular events to talk only of generic events is
defective
In a concluding chapter

I

shall review some of the

think that there
motivations which have led philosophers to

XI

are events.

I

shall also list some problems which any

adequate theory of events ought to solve.

I

shall claim

that none of the three theories considered has acceptable

solutions to all of these problems.

For this reason, and

on the basis of the specific criticisms developed in

earlier chapters

,

I

shall conclude that none of the three

theories is at present acceptable.

I

would like to express my appreciation to the

members of my committee, Professors Gareth B. Matthews,
Fred Feldman, and Terence Parsons, for their care in

reading earlier versions of this dissertation and for
their helpfulness in suggesting improvements.

I

would also like to express my appreciation to my wife
for much encouragement
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Notes to the Preface
^We might mention a few authors: Montague,

"On the

Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities" Monist 53 (1969):
"Aspects of Action" Appendix II of Rescher,

159-194; Rescher,

ed., The Logic of Decision and Action (Pittsburgh, 1966)
"The Logic of Action - - A Sketch"

215-219; von Wright,
in Rescher, op. cit

.

,

121-136; R.M

Their Descriptions" in Margolis

,

Martin, "On Events and

ed., Fact and Existence

"Individuation of Action"

(Oxford, 1969): 63-74; Goldman,

Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971)

.

:

761-774

,

and A Theory

of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970).

Incidentally,

the theories of Martin and Goldman are quite similar to Kim's

view
2

Actually

,

I

think that the second distinction is more
Aside from a brief

properly thought of as a continuum.
remark in the conclusion, however,

I

do not consider al-

ternatives between extreme fine-grained and extreme coarse-

grained approaches to event individuation.

Also,

I

have

can
some reservations as to whether the first distinction

be clearly drawn.

See Chapter VI, note 27.

The remarks

and
of this paragraph should be taken as introductory

superficial
3

He prefers the word ‘generic'.

^ The

is
first feature, that events are particular,

Since
treated implicitly to the following extent.
quantifies over
Davidson's account of action sentences

Xlll

particular events

,

that account would provide a reason

for embracing particular events, if it were acceptable.
But, as

Thus

,

I

shall argue in Chapter III, it is unacceptable.

the view that events are particular is not supported

in at least one way in which Davidson thinks that it is.
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CHAPTER

I

KIM ON EVENTS
In a recent series of articles, Jaegwon Kim has developed

an increasingly detailed and elegant theory of events.

1

Kim's

proposals have been motivated by a desire to clarify the ontological issues underlying discussion of causation and exThus, his theory is primarily an attempt to analyse

planation.

those entities which are the objects of explanation and the

relata of the relation of causation.

2

Of particular interest

are his claim that events are structured and his adoption of
a canonical notation to make explicit that structure.

In the first

This chapter is divided into three parts.

In the second

section

I

shall briefly present Kim's theory.

section

I

shall consider an argument to the effect that Kim's

theory has the consequence that there is only one event.
Finally,
1.

I

shall offer some criticisms of the theory.

Kim' s View

.

On Kim's view, an event is a complex

which consists in an object (or n-tuple of objects) exemplifying a property (or n-adic relation) at an instant or
during an interval of time.

In monadic

3

cases, an event is

time.
simply the having of a property by a thing at a

refer to events, Kim introduces the notation

'

[

P]

(x, t)

where x is the constitutive object of the event,

To

P is

'

the

time.
constitutive property, and t is the constitutive
'

[(x,t), P]

is read as

'the having of P by x at t

.

^ince

property by an object,
Kim takes events to be the having of a

2

his notion of 'event' is very broad, encompassing things which

might ordinarily be thought of as states, states of affairs,
or conditions.
In the case of monadic events, there is a fairly straight-

forward condition of event identity:
The event [(x,t), P] is identical to the event
t
and P=Q.
(y_,
Q] if and only if x=y_, t=t

I,:

[

'

)

,

,

'

Thus, Socrates' drinking hemlock is the same event as Xantippe's
But, Socrates' dying is distinct

husband's drinking hemlock.

from Xantippe's becoming a widow, for although the times at

which these two events occur are identical, the respective
constitutive objects and constitutive properties are distinct.
This seems to accord with intuition, since Socrates' dying

occurred in prison, while Xantippe's becoming a widow, if it
occurred anywhere, presumably occurred wherever she was at the
time of Socrate's death.

Kim's treatment of events in which the constitutive

attribute is a relation is slightly more complicated.

Kim abbreviates the n-tuple
'

(

x-j^

,

.

.

.

,x

R

,

t)

'

'

(^

/

is abbreviated as

***
'

/

(x

—n^
n

aS

'

,t)

'

^~n^

'

5

First,

an<^

The canonical

.

as
notation can then accommodate events involving relations,

illustrated in the following condition of event existence.
exists if and only
P
Existence condition:
exemplifies
if the n-tuple of concrete objects (x
t.
time
at
the n-adic empirical attribute P
]

)

as denoting a
Kim notes that his notation is not to be taken

triple.

The triple (x_.t,P

n
)

exists if (xj

t,

and

P

n

exist.

3

By contrast

,

the event

[(x,

n

,t), P n ]

existence condition, only if

(x

«n

exists, according to the

satisfies P n at —
t.

)

To the objection that his theory is committed to the

position that

(Brutus,

[

stabs Caesar] is distinct from

t)

[(Brutus, Caesar, t), stabs], Kim replies that "mixed universals"

such as stabbing Caesar are not admissible as constitutive
Rather, only "pure universals" are

attributes of events.

\

allowed to be constituents of events.
the dyadic events

Brutus,

t)

[(Brutus, Caesar,

6

Kim does admit that

t)

,

To account for

are identical.

is stabbed by]

and [(Caesar,

stabs]

this, Kim states an identity condition for dyadic events
First,

which has the requisite identity as a consequence.

Kim defines for any dyadic relation R, a relation R* which
is its converse.
I9

:

Then:

R]= (u,v,t'
Q] if and only if either
and R=Q or (ii) (x,y)
(x,y)=(u,v), t=t
(i)
(v,u) , t=t', and R=Q*.
),

)

[

,

'

To generalize I2 to handle n-adic events, Kim attempts to
He notes that any n- tuple

generalize the notion of converse.
can be permuted in n! ways.

Where k is a scheme of permutation

on sequences of length n, Kim writes

result of permuting
k,

(x^)

by

'

k(x n

)

to denote the

Moreover, for each permutation

li*

there is an inverse k~^ such that k

(k (x n )

)

= (x n

)

.

Kim

follows:
then introduces a generalized notioa of converse as

and R is
If k is a permutation on n— termed sequences
relation
adic
n—
the
be
to
an n-adic relation, k(R) is
only
and
if
k(R)
has
(x n
such that, for every ($ n
-1
k(x n
k,
each
for
that,
It follows
has R.
(x n
if k
)

,

)

)

)

4

has k (R) if and only if (x
has R.
The n! permutations
of an n-adic relation R can be thought of as the converses
of R. 8
)

With this generalized notion of converse in hand, Kim gives
a general condition for event identity.
I

n

if and onl Y if there
t(2$n't, p ]=
exists a permutation k on n-termed sequences
and P=k (Q)
such that (x n =k(y m
t=t

:

[

1

)

Thus,

)

t

[(Agnes, the tin drum, Oskar,

tin drum, Agnes, Oskar,

t)

,

t)

,

x gives

to zj=[(the

£ to

since there

x is given by

z_] ,

is a permutation- -the one that switches the first two members

of a triple--f rom which the constitutive sequence

mentioned

by the event description on the left of the identity sign is

transformed into the sequence mentioned by the event description
on the right.

Kim thinks that a chief merit of his account of events is
that on his theory events are structures.

The structure of

events corresponds, according to Kim, to the grammatical

structure of those sentences which refer to events.

Thus, a

salient feature of Kim's analysis is that sentences or statements

9

refer to, describe, represent, or specify events.

Al-

though Kim frequently uses the word 'refer' to characterize
and
the relation holding between event-describing statements

events,

I

think he is most plausibly construed as intending

relation of
some special relation, distinct from the familiar
Kim
however.
referring. Not all sentences describe events,
says

question
Generally speaking, the class of statements in they
that
can be delineated very roughly by saying

5

attribute an empirical property (or relation) to a
concrete object (or ordered set of objects) at a time.
And we assume that for each event-describing statement
there is some unique event specified or described by
10

it
2.

The Trivialization Argument

.

The notion that sentences

refer to events, together with two natural assumptions, seems
to lead, via a familiar argument, to the conclusion that there
is only one event.

Recall that on Kim's view the event of

Socrates' dying is the same as Xantippe
As Kim would put it,

'Socrates died' and

describe the same event.

died'

'

husband's dying.

s

'

Xantippe

husband

's

A natural conclusion to draw

from this is that the replacement of co-designative singular
terms in an event-describing statement preserves the identity
of the event referred to, that is,
C)

If a statement S' is obtained from a statement S
by replacing any referring expression in S by a
co-referential expression, then if S is eventdescribing, S and S' describe the same event.

Similarly, we have seen that Kim wants to identify the events

described by 'Brutus stabbed Caesar' and 'Caesar was stabbed
by Brutus'.

This identification is not sanctioned by

It is justified, however, by the equally plausible
L)

(C)

.

(L)

Logically equivalent statements describe the same
event
.

But now

(C)

and

(L)

generate the following argument.

Let p

in truth
and q be any event-describing statements which agree

value.

Consider,

1)

P

2)

£x lx= A

&

pj

=

\ /\\

6

(1)

3)

\x\x= K

4)

q.

and

(2)

&

q\ =

\l\\

describe the same event, according to

they are logically equivalent.
in truth value, £x|x=A

to
(3)

(C)

,

(2)

and

&

=

is logically equivalent to

describe the same event.

since

Moreover, since p and q agree

$xlx=A

&

qj

;

and thus, according

describe the same event.

(3)

(L)

(4)

(L)

Finally, since

has it that they

Since no false statement describes

an event, Kim adds, all true event-describing statements seem

to describe the same event. 12
.

Kim responds to this argument by considering the two

principles

(L)

and

(C)

He notes that the subject-predicate,

.

grammatical structure of an event-describing statement is

reflected in the structure of the event described.

Further-

more, he has loosely defined event-describing statements as

those which attribute a property (or relation) to an object
(or sequence of objects)

at a time.

But not all statements

logically equivalent to event-describing statements have the
right structure or attribute an empirical property to an object, and thus, are not themselves event-describing.

In

particular, Kim suggests that while 'Socrates drank hemlock
is event-describing,
is not.

'

^x|x=A& Socrates drank hemlock £

=

\

1

aV

Rather, "the second statement affirms a certain set-

theoretic fact which obtains if and only if the event described
by the first exists; but it does not describe, refer to, or

specify any event.

Thus, at the least,

(L)

should be

7

restricted to event-describing statements.

And if this

restriction is adopted, it does not follow that
describe the same event.

So,

(1)

and

(2)

the argument is blocked.

However, even restricted to event-describing statements,
(L)

is not without its problems.

Xantippe

'

s

For Kim thinks that

husband's dying and Xantippe

are distinct events, even though

1

s

becoming a widow

Xantippe 's husband died'

'

and 'Xantippe became a widow' are logically equivalent.

Kim

argues that these events are distinct, for the former occurred
in the prison where Socrates drank the hemlock, while the

latter

— if

it makes sense to say where it occurred

where Xantippe was, which was not in the prison.

— occurred
Kim further

notes that the two statements ascribe different properties
to different individuals, and thus, by

(I n

)

,

construed as referring to distinct events.

ought to be

What is puzzling

about this example is why Kim thinks that the two statements
are logically equivalent.

If

'

Xantippe

'

s

husband' is a rigid

designator for Socrates, there is no reason at all to think
that the two statements are logically equivalent.

Xantippe

'

s

For,

husband, that is, Socrates, could have died even
In such a case,

had Xantippe never married.

'Xantippe'

husband died' would have been true and 'Xantippe became
widow' false.

So, perhaps

'

a

Xantippe 's husband' should be

understood non-rigidly, that is, as picking out in each world

whoever happens to be Xantippe

'

s

there is exactly one such person)

husband in that world (if
.

Suppose Xantippe predeceases

8

her husband

Then clearly it would not be true that at her

.

husband's death Xantippe becomes a widow.
clear that
think not.

'

Xantippe

's

But is it also

husband dies' would be false?

I

Perhaps if Xantippe had predeceased her husband

by a considerable amount of time, and if he had subsequently

remarried, we would be reluctant to say near the end of his
life that he has the property of being married to Xantippe

(although we would admit then that he has the property of

having been married to Xantippe)

But this is not a reason

.

\

for thinking that in such a case

'

Xantippe

'

s

husband died'

is false at and after the death of her husband.

Anyway, it

is possible that Xantippe and her husband die simultaneously,

and in this case surely 'Xantippe became a widow* is false

while

'

Xantippe

'

s

husband died' is true.

Thus

conclude

I

that the example of these events does not provide an ex-

ception to

(L)

restricted to event-describing statements.

Kim has another putative counter-example to
to event-describing statements.
5)

Wilbur married Edith, and

6)

Edith married Wilbur

(L)

restricted

He suggests that

are logically equivalent, although they describe different

events.

Kim's reason for thinking that

(5)

and

(6)

describe

different events is that what explains why Wilbur married
Edith need not explain why Edith married Wilbur.
two events here?

Are there

We might think that on Kim's view

(5)

and

9

(6)

describe, respectively,
7)

[(Wilbur, t

8)

[(Edith, t

)

)

,

,

marries Edith], and
marries Wilbur],

But marries Edith is surely a "mixed universal" 14 and is thus

inadmissible as a constitutive property.
holds for marries Wilbur

,

so

We might think then that

all.

and

(7)

(5)

(8)

and

The same remark
are not events, after

(6)

describe

\

9)

[(Wilbur, Edith, t

)

,

marries], and

10)

[(Edith, Wilbur, t

)

,

marries].

But now note that since the relation denoted by 'x marries
is symmetric, all of its converses are identical.
is a permutation on ordered pairs which transforms

Edith)

y_'

Also, there
(Wilbur,

into (Edith, Wilbur) and has associated with it a

converse of the relation marries

refer to the same event.

.

Thus, by

(I n )

,

(9)

and (10)

So Kim has not given us a case in

which, according to his own theory,

(L)

restricted to event-

describing statements fails.
In a footnote Kim suggests that it might be argued that

the apparent explanatory and causal asymmetry between

and

(6)

results from understanding those sentences as

11)

Wilbur intentionally marries Edith, and

12)

Edith intentionally marries Wilbur,

respectively.

(5)

But these two are not logically equivalent.

Accordingly, Kim suggests modifying the example to
13)

Wilbur intentionally marries Edith who intentionally
marries him.

14)

Edith intentionally marries Wilbur who intentionally
marries her.

10

Now (13) and (14) seem to be logically equivalent.
they describe different events?

into Kim's canonical notation?

How would they translate
If we let

'intentionally marries',

'w'

abbreviate 'Edith',

and (14)

13
14

'

'

)

wMe

&

eMw

)

eMw

&

wMe

(13)

xW y_ =df xM£

&

'M'

abbreviate

abbreviate 'Wilbur', and

Now we can define a predicate
15)

But do

'W'

'e'

can be written as

as

yMx.

In terms of these abbreviations, then,

and (14)

(13)

really

amount, respectively, to
13'') wWe
14'')

eWw

In that case, the events described by (13)

and (14) seem to

be given, respectively, by
16)

[(w,

e,

t),

xWy

]

17)

[

(e

w,

t)

xWy

]

,

,

,

and

But, as in the earlier case, there is a permutation, k, on

ordered pairs which transforms (w,e) into (e,w)
denotes a relation which any pair
case k-l(x,£), that is,

(£,x)

,

(x,y_)

and (17)

exemplifies

describe the same event.

and

'

xW y_'

exemplifies just in
xWy;.

follows from the fact that xW y_ is symmetric.
(16)

,

But then by

So again

that Kim has not provided us with an exception to

restricted to event-describing statements.

This last

I

(I

conclude
(L)

14

eventDoes it follow that no two logically equivalent

n

)

t

11

describing statements refer to different events?
not.

I

think

Consider,
18)

Jones constructs an equiangular triangle, and

19)

Jones constructs an equilateral triangle.

Clearly,

(18)

and (19)

are logically equivalent.

Moreover,

they respectively describe
20)

[(Jones, t )

,

constructs an equiangular triangle], and

21)

[(Jones, t

,

constructs an equilateral triangle].

)

Since the constitutive properties of these events are distinct,
it follows according to Kim's theory, that the events are

distinct.

We might wonder, of course, whether these ought to

be construed as distinct events, but that is another question.

Kim also objects to

(C)

the principle which sanctions

substitution of co-extensive singular terms in event-describing
statements.

Since, as we have already seen, Kim thinks that

Socrates' dying and Xantippe's husband's dying are the same
event, we should expect that the co-extensive term 'Xantippe's

husband' could be substituted for 'Socrates' in 'Socrates died'

without change of reference.

However, the following kind of

case seems objectionable to Kim.

Suppose that Wilbur is both

the best player on the team and the fastest player on the

team, then,
22)

The best player on the team = the fastest player on
the team.

In virtue of

(22)

(C)

would have it that

23)

Wilbur is the best player on the team, and

24)

Wilbur is the fastest player on the team

12

describe the same event.

Kim notes that there is an ex-

planatory asymmetry between

and (24).

(23)

We might, for

example, explain the former by reference to the latter, but
we would probably not explain Wilbur's being the fastest

player on the team by pointing out that he is the best player.
Kim responds to this case by invoking a distinction of
Wiggins'

between genuine identity statements and statements

of predication.

According to Kim

(23)

and (24)

are statements

of predication, and the singular terms in the respective

predicates do not make "genuine reference".

Finally, Kim

says that co-extensive singular terms may be substituted in
an event-describing statement only if the terms make "genuine

reference" in the statement.

Incidentally, since genuine

identity statements do not attribute an empirical property
to an object at a time, they are not event-describing state-

ments.

This restriction serves to further block the above

trivialization argument, since

(2)

ana

(3)

cannot describe

the same event if they are not event-describing statements
in the first place.

Not all have agreed with Kim's rejection of
F.

Robert Bohl, Jr.,

counter-examples to

17

(L)

and

(C)

for example, has argued that Kim's

(C)

and

(L)

are implausible and that the

supposition that sentences refer commits one to those
principles.

Although

I

have already argued that Kim has

failed to provide counter-examples to

event-describing statements,

I

(L)

restricted to

do not find Bohl's rejection

.

13

of Kim's examples especially convincing. He says, for example,

that the location at which an event occurs is often unclear.

With this

I

agree, but the fact that the location of an event

is sometimes unclear does not refute the claim that Socrates'

dying and Xantippe

'

s

becoming a widow are distinct.

For it

is clear that the former occurred only in the prison and the

latter did not occur only in the prison.

Bohl also thinks

that explanatory asymmetry cannot be used to individuate
events.

His claim is that events are explained only "under

a description",

and thus, what counts as an explanation of

an event depends in part on how the event is described.

I

shall not attempt here to make sense of the notion of ex-

planation "under a description".

1

Rather,

I

shall discuss

Bohl's claim that if sentences are taken as referring expressions,

(L)

and

(C)

ought to hold.

Bohl claims that if we take sentences to be referring

expressions, we should strive to avoid any disanalogy between
sentences and other referring expressions such as proper names
and definite descriptions.

He says.

In order that we make the analogy between sentences
and other referring expressions as strong as possible,
we ought to have some way of saying that sentences
refer to the same entity without mentioning those
It is clear that material equivalence will
sentences.
not do at all, for then any two true sentences will
To accept logical equivalence
refer to the same event.
Stronger, intensional con(L) ]
would be to accept
nectives will serve to break the analogy down, for we
do not need such a strong connective for definite
descriptions and names; such connectives would probably
serve only if we were willing to say two sentences refer
to the same event if and only if they mean the sam^g
thing, which would clearly be unacceptable to Kim.
[

14

The exact structure of Bohl's argument is not clear to
me,
but,

he elsewhere provides a hint as to what he means.

"...

[W]e have a straightforward way of saying in our language

that two ordinary referring terms are co-referential, namely,

identity sentences.

We do not have an analogous way of saying

that two sentences are co-referential, i.e., a way in which
we use rather than mention the sentences." 20

Perhaps Bohl

\

has something like the following in mind:

"In the case of

names and descriptions, we can say things like
25)

What

Cicero = Tully.

(25)

says is that two names are co-referential, and it

says this by using the names, not by mentioning them.

If

sentences are to be referring expressions analogous to names
and descriptions, there must be a way of saying that two

sentences are co-referential without mentioning the sentences.
An obvious device for accomplishing this is to assert that
two sentences are logically equivalent."

But this seems to be mistaken.

(25)

does not assert

that two names are co-referential, that is,

(25)

does not

assert that
26)

'Cicero'

and 'Tully' are co-referential.

To see this, it suffices to note that (26)

,

but not

(25)

tails that the expressions 'Cicero' and 'Tully' exist.

enSo

perhaps Bohl means that if two names are co-referential we
can form an assertion of identity which uses rather than

mentions the expressions.

If sentences are to be analogous

15

to names and descriptions, we ought to be able to do
something

similar with them.

The only natural option seems to be to

assert their logical equivalence.
First a minor quibble:

ordinarily, when we assert that

two sentences are logically equivalent, we mention, rather

than use, the sentences, as when we say, falsely,

Xantippe s husband died' is logically equivalent
to 'Xantippe became a widow'.
1

27)

Thus,

'

'is logically equivalent to'

analogue of

'='

cannot be the sentential

We can, using a slightly more complicated

connective, avoid this criticism, as in

Necessarily, Xantippe s husband died if and only
if Xantippe became a widow.

28)

'

We have already seen that Kim would regard (28)

as an unac-

ceptable way of expressing event-identity, because it is too
broad, leading to an identification of distinct events.

But

requiring logical equivalence for two statements to describe
the same event Is also too stringent, for according to Kim,

'Socrates dies' and

'

Xantippe

's

21

husband died' refer to the

same event although they are not logically equivalent.

To return to Bohl's argument, why is 'Necessarily,

if

and only if...' the only natural sentential analogue of '='?
If we reflect for a moment on the fact that (25) would

normally be expressed in English, not by using the identity
sign

'

=
'

29)

but as

Cicero is the same person as Tully

we might think of an alternative to 'Necessarily,

only if...'.

In fact,

I

if and

think a sentential connective which

16

satisfies Bohl's requirement that the connective operate
on

sentences and not on names of sentences and which satisfies

Kim
'

intuitions as to which events are identical, is

s

That

is the same event as that...'.

,

If this connective

does the trick, then accepting that sentences refer and that
they bear a close analogy to names and descriptions need not

commit us to

(L)

We might think that no instance of this schema will be
true, since the result of pre-fixing 'that' to a sentence

denotes a proposition, not an event.

Thus, all instances

of this schema would say that some proposition is the same

event as some other proposition, and such a claim would, on
the face of it, seem to be false.

Nevertheless, it is surely

open to Kim to deny that, for example,

'that Socrates died'

denotes a proposition and assert rather that it denotes an
event.

This seems to fit in with his claim that the sentence

'Socrates died' refers to an event.
he need be committed to

Thus,

I

do not think that

(L)

Bohl also claims that considerations similar to those he
has already advanced should force us to accept

(C)

if we

believe that sentences refer to events and if we believe that
sentences should bear a close analogy to other referring expressions.

Kim denied that co-extensive singular terms can

be substituted in event-describing sentences without the

possibility of a shift in reference unless the singular terms
make genuine reference in the containing sentences.

But

17

according to Bohl:
Again if we consider the analogy between sentences
and other referring expressions, e.g.
definite
descriptions, we find that in the case of definite
descriptions such as 'the present king of Greece' 22
we may substitute for terms which do not make genuine
reference, in this case 'Greece', and there is no
change of reference.
If, then, sentences are to be
referring expressions, there would seem no reason to
restrict possible substitutions in the way Kim suggests.
,

Bohl goes on to claim that

(C)

is plausible because "there is

an analogy between it and principles which are appropriate to

our usual English referring expressions."

Bohl's point, pre-

sumably, is that given the truth of
30)

Greece = the country whose capital is Athens

we can replace 'Greece' by 'the country whose capital is Athens'
in 'the present king of Greece'

to obtain an expression which

also denotes King Constantine, even though 'Greece' does not

make genuine reference in the first description.

The most

that this shows, however, is that some substitutions of co-

extensive terms within definite descriptions, even where those
terms do not make genuine reference, preserves reference.

But

Kim can consistently admit that, as well as admitting that
some substitutions of co-extensive singular terms in event-

describing statements preserves reference, even though the
terms fail to make genuine reference.

For example,

I

believe

that Kim would hold that the following pair of statements

refer to the same event.
31)

The present king of Greece lives in Italy.

32)

The present king of the country whose capital is
Athens lives in Italy.

18

We can admit that the inference that (31) and (32) describe
the same event given the truth of
of

(C)

is a correct instance

(30)

without thereby being committed to the truth of

(C)

And Kim has merely held that not all of the inferences

sanctioned by

are correct.

(C)

Moreover, not all substitu-

tions of co-extensive singular terms within definite descriptions preserve reference.

There are exceptions when the

singular terms fail to make genuine reference or when they
fail to make any reference at all.
33)

Even given the truth of

The fastest player on the team = the best player
on the team.

'the property of being the best player on the team'

and 'the

property of being the fastest player on the team' are not coextensive.

Thus, given the failure of such substitutions in

the case of definite descriptions, Kim's rejection of

(C)

seems to strengthen rather than weaken the analogy between

sentences and other referring expressions.
Note that

(C)

should not be confused with the more

plausible principle (C'):
C')

If a statement S'

is obtained from a statement S

by replacing any referring expression, <* in S by
such that =* and £
another referring expression,
are co-referential in S and S', respectively, then if
S is event-describing, S and S' describe the same
event.
(3

,

Nor need Kim be construed as denying (C').
put as follows.

If

(23)

His claim may be

is understood as a statement of

identity, that is, as
23')

Wilbur = the best player on the team

19

then it is not event-describing.

On the other hand, if (23)

is understood as a statement of
predication, it amounts to

23'')

Wilbur has the property of being the best player
on
the team.

But 'the best player on the team' and 'the fastest
player on
the team', though co-referential, are not
co-referential
in

the context 'the property that...'; and thus,
substitution

of the one term for the other is not justified by

though it is permitted by
a

(C)

.

(C')

c
(

'

)

al-

is a close relative of

familiar Fregean principle of substitution whereby substitu-

tion of singular terms in a given context is reference-

preserving not merely if the terms are co-extensive, but if
they are co-extensive in that context

.

It seems to be in

Kim's favor that he denies that unrestricted substitution of

co-extensive singular terms in an event-describing statement
preserves the identity of the event described.
analogue of

(C)

For the

that co-extensive singular terms are every-

where substitutable without shift of reference, is false.
But it also seems to be in Kim's favor that what he says is

consistent with(C'), for given a Fregean semantics, the general
referential analogue of

C
(

'

is indeed plausible.

In conclusion, then, Kim seems to me to be correct to

deny

(L)

and

(C)

Finally, let me note that both of Bohl's

arguments require that there be a strong analogy between

sentences and other referring expressions if sentences are
to be referring expressions, but

I

know of no reason to think

20

that this is true, especially in the absence of an exact

specification of which characteristics are required to sustain
the analogy.
3.

Criticism of Kim*

s

Theory

We have seen some of the

.

details of Kim's theory, and we have seen that it can plausibly
Now let us

resist the challenge of a trivialization argument.
turn to a criticism of the theory.

think that the theory is

I

In this section

regretably vague in certain crucial respects.
shall try to indicate some of those respects.

I

Central to the Identity Condition

I

the generalized
R is

notion of a converse of a relation, which Kim attempted to
formulate with the aid of permutations on sequences and rela
tions associated with each permutation.

Kim introduces k(R)

24

,

Here again is how

which is the converse of the relation R

generated by a permutation k on

R.

"If k is a permutation on

be
n-termed sequences and R is an n-adic relation, k(R) is to
has k(R)
(x n
the n-adic relation such that, for every (x n
_1
It follows that, for each k,
has R.
(x n
if and only if k
)

)

)

k
— (x
wn

)

has k
—

(

R)

if and only if

(x

R

)

has R."

25

Let us, in a

find its conparticular case, see how for a given relation we
permutation
There is only one permutation--the identity
verse.

— on

sequences of length

1.

Thus, where n— 1, k

^2Sn^

the two quoted sentences
So in the monadic case, the first of
(1-adic relation) such
tells us that k(R) is the property
But,
only if x has R.
that, for every x, x has k(R) if and
property there is a unique
is it the case that for every

21

property a thing has just in case it has the
first property?
No, the familiar example that all and only
creatures which
are members of a species whose well-formed
members have a
heart are members of a species whose well-formed
members
have a kidney provides a counter-instance. One
property a
thing has if and only if it is a member of a species
whose

well-formed members have
member

of_

a

heart is the property being a

a species whose well-f ormed members have a heart.

But another property a thing has if and only if it has this

property is being a member of a species whose well-formed
members have a kidney

Thus,

.

'k(R)

is not well-defined.

In fairness to Kim, it should be noted that he admits that

he has not given a definition.

He says, in a footnote,

"This

is not intended as a definition, but only an informal ex-

position, of 'k(R)

*

As a definition it would likely be

.

construed as presupposing an extensional interpretation of
attributes (whether in the possible-world semantics or in
some other scheme)

issue here."

26

,

whereas

prefer to be silent on this

I

Let us take that parenthetical remark as a

hint as to how 'k(R)

should be defined.

that for all k
— and (x
Ayn

)

and only if k-^(x

n

)

,

v»n )

has if

(x

~n

(x

R

)

)

,

k(R)
—

is the relation such

has k(R)

if and only if

Let us see, again, how this revised definition

has R.

would work in

(x

has R, we could require the stronger

that in all possible worlds
n)

is the relation

k(R)
—

condition that for all k— and

k“l(x

Instead of saying

a

monadic case.

As before, the inverse of any

22

permutation on

1

tuples is simply the identity permutation,

so the revision comes to:
34)

(k) (x) (k(R) is the relation such that
if and only if x has R)

q

(x
_

has k(R)
“

)

Does
R?

(34)

succeed in defining 'k(R)' for monadic properties

think that it does not; it is plausible only if properties

I

that are co-extensive in all possible worlds are identical.

But some properties co-extensive in all possible worlds are
not identical.

Suppose that x is a triangle.

Is there a

unique property which x has in all and only those worlds in

which x is an equiangular triangle?

No,

for one candidate is

the property being an equiangular triangle
an equi lateral triangle

definition of 'k(R)

Thus

,

;

another is being

this attempt to revise the

is unsuccessful.

But then we do not

know exactly what is to count as the converse of

a

relation.

Another respect in which Kim's account of events is
vague, is that he places restrictions on which attribuces
are eligible to be constitutive attributes of events without

making clear exactly how these restrictions are to be understood.

An important feature of Kim's theory is that every

event has a unique constitutive property.

properties he calls "generic events".
properties count as "generic events"?

27

These constitutive
But exactly winch

Kim does say that

constitutive properties must be empirical or factual.

He

suggests that this condition is intended to exclude tautological
or evaluative properties.

But until we have a precise idea of

23

what empirical, factual, and tautological properties are,
we cannot know exactly which properties can be constituents
of events.

Kim also says that no "concocted"

properties can be

constituents, although except for suggesting that being
fifty mile east of a burnin g barn is concocted, he gives no

clue as to which properties he means to exclude.

Finally, as we have already noticed, Kim excludes

"mixed universals", requiring that constitutive properties
be "pure universals".

According to Kim, x stabs Caesar is a

"mixed universal", while x stabs y is "pure".

We might pro-

pose the following as an attempt to characterize this

distinction.
M)

n
P
is
(xi ,
.

P)
(M)

mixed if and only if
.

.

,

Xjj

[P n (x]_,

P n is pure

.

.

.

,5^)

£ f° r an Y sequence
(EP n+1 ) (P n+ f (xy,
,Xn,y)

(Ey)

.

There is some

y_,

i_s

namely, Caesar, such that if anyone

stabs Caesar, there is a relation, namely, x stabs

such

y_,

Note

that (Caesar's stabber, Caesar) satisfies x stab s y.
that the arrow in

.

P n is not mixed.

has the result, as it should, that x stabs Caesar

mixed.

.

(M)

must stand for strict implication and

not material implication, for otherwise every property will
be mixed.

To see this, pick some property P.

exemplified,

(M)

is true vacuously.

If P is not

If P is exemplified,

then there is something, say Socrates, such that the'

property, namely, P and x is

a^

c

man, such tnat (whatever

satisfies P, Socrates) satisfies this latter property.

is a

)

]

}
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The following, however, seems to be a counter-example
to

(M)

There is something, namely, the number nine, such

.

that if anything,

£

is.

¥_

number

a.

is a man,

z^,

(

z_ ,

satisfies x

9)

But this property seems intuitively

.

least insofar as this distinction is intuitive)
We can avoid this objection by recasting
(M*

to be pure.

as

(M)

p s m i X ed if and only if (Ey)
y exists
[
contingently & for any sequence (x-[
,x n
[Pn(x lf
(EPn+1) (pn+1 (xp
xn )
,x^ ,y
,

)

.

.

f

appears to have the consequence that x

.

.

.

is_

taller than Galbraith

,

.

)

.

is_

)
)

] \

greater than

seven is pure, since seven exists necessarily.

with x

(at

pn
)

.

(M'

man

is_ a

which is mixed.

This contrasts
I

think that

this is harmless enough; it merely suggests that the distinc-

tion between mixed and pure universals is a metaphysical one
\

rather than a linguistic one.

Both

(M)

and (M')

seem to have

the further consequence that x rides Pegasus into battle is

pure, since Pegasus does not exist.

One way to avoid this

would be to prefix the characterization of 'mixed' with 'Q

'.

Another way would be to add the conjunct 'is exemplified' to
the definiens of

(P)

On this alternative some properties

would be neither mixed nor pure.

Perhaps neither step need

be taken, for, according to Kim, only exemplified pure

universals are constituents of events.
There is, however, a more serious objection to (M'):
it entails that every property is mixed.
y to be pure.

But there is some

2^,

Kim wants x stabs

namely, the event of

there being some stabbing event or other (call this event

25
'e')

such that whenever a pair (a,b,)

there is a relation x stabs
y and

— me

z_

satisfies x stabs y,

is the event of there

grabbing event which (a,b,e) satisfies.

Since e

— it exists only in those worlds
someone — it follows according to (M

exists contingently

someone stabs

1

)

-tabs

I.

1S mixed. 29

gene raliz able

.

I

Moreover

,

in which

that x

this objection seems to be

think that these considerations indicate

how difficult it is to characterize mixed universals.

But

unless we have some adequate characterization, we do not know

which properties can be constituents of events.
Although we do not have a characterization in hand, we
can,

I

think, proceed to distinguish some mixed and pure

universals.

The property x stabs Caesar is mixed; so is x

stabs y with this knife
is x stabs

y with

a

The property x stabs y is pure; so

.

knife

stabs y intentionally

.

;

so are x stabs

y regretfully and

We can suppose all of these pure

universals to have been exemplified by (Brutus, Caesar).
by the existence condition,
[(Brutus, Caesar,

t)

,

[(Brutus, Caesar, t

x stabs

y with

a knife]

,

)

,

[(Brutus,

t)

x stabs

y intentionally] all exist. We might be puzzled by

x stabs

y regretfully], and [(Brutus, Caesar,

the multiplicity of events here.

Thus,

x stabs y]

Caesar,

,

x

We might wonder, for

example, how they are all related. Some of them could have

occurred without others of them having occurred.

And we

might wonder which of them is Brutus' killing of Caesar.
The answer to this last question is, presumably, none of

t)

,
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them; for stabbing is not the same as killing

.

Moreover, no

one of the mentioned events need have occurred for
Brutus

killing of Caesar to have occurred.
ficulty.

Suppose Jones has a pain in his right foot and he

has a pain in his left foot.
[(Jones,

Here is another dif-

t)

foot], and

has a pain],
[(Jones,

t)

Then the following events exist:

[(Jones,

t)

,

has a pain in his right

has a pain in his left foot ]. 30

are these events related?

How

It is tempting to say that the

first is a generic event of which the latter two are

particular instances.
Kim.

But this suggestion is not open to

For him, generic events are properties--those properties

which are constituents of events.

Moreover, according to Kim,

no event is an instance of more than one generic event.

Thus,

the last-named event is an instance of the generic event

having a pain in one

'

s

left foot

,

and not, on Kim's view,

an instance of Jones' having a pain.

So far

I

have discussed restrictions on which properties

may be constituents of events.

But Kim also restricts the

objects which may be constituents of events.

Kim says at

one point that events are "realizations of properties at

particular space-time regions or by objects
some sort of substance ontology) ....
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(if one accepts

Kim goes on to say

that he opts for objects rather than space-time regions.

In

another place Kim says that "we may represent an event by the

notation

'

[x,

P,

t]

where x is an object ('Substance')...,"
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and he goes on to add that where "P is a mental property, that

27

may place a certain constraint on the kind
of substance x
"
is
Thus, I think it is clear that the
constitutive

objects of events must be substances according
to Kim,

although it is certainly left open as to what
a substance
is and what sorts of substances there
are.

tion seems to lead to a difficulty.

But this restric-

Consider the apparent

event-describing statement, 'Beethoven's Ninth Symphony was
performed in 1824*. The obvious way of translating this
statement into Kim's canonical notation is as
Ninth, 1824), was performed]'.

Beethoven

s

'

[(Beethoven's

But this will not do, for

Ninth is not a substance.

But then how do we,

in canonical notation, refer to the event (let us suppose

that the first performance was the only performance that year)

which was the first performance of Beethoven's Ninth ?

Perhaps

the event can be construed as the having of a very complicated

property (involving playing certain notes in

a

certain order,

making certain motions and gestures, listening, and more) by
a very large sequence of objects

(including the members of

the orchestra and chorus, the conductor, and perhaps even the

members of the audience)

.

Or perhaps there is some object,

maybe the concert hall, which has the property of being such
that Beethoven's Ninth was first performed in it.
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But

even if we could establish what sort of property and what
sort of sequence the having of the former by the latter is
the first performance of Beethoven's Ninth

property and which sequence is involved?

,

exactly which

As in the earlier

28

case of Brutus' killing Caesar, there seems
to be an endless
number of possibilities. And this, I think
points up an

important limitation in Kim's theory:

he has given us a

fairly precise method for translating event-describing

statements into his canonical notation, but he has
given us
no information at all as to how to put into canonical
form
an event description which is a definite description.

Finally

,

there seems to be a kind of essentialism in-

volved in Kim's theory which

I

find counter-intuitive.

point to be made applies equally,

I

think, to constitutive

objects and constitutive properties, but
terms of constitutive times.

The

I

shall put it in

Suppose we consider some event

such as Jones' speaking from 8:00 p.m. to 9:45 p.m.

Suppose,

further, that we have established that this event is

[(Jones,

8:00-8:45), speaking].

We might normally say things like,

had this event been a little shorter it would have been more

effective, or had it been a little shorter the audience

might not have begun walking out.

That is, we might normally

say of this event, call it 'S', that it could have been dif-

ferent in certain respects, and in particular, we might say

that

S

could have been a little shorter.

But Kim's theory

has it that had Jones stopped speaking at 8:35,

S

have existed, not that it would have been shorter.

would not
Of course,

if Jones had stopped speaking at 8:35, there would have been

another event, call it

*

S*
,

But S* is a different event.

that would have existed instead.
My complaint can be put as
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follows:

Kim's theory is committed to saying, in cases
like

this, that there would have been a different event,
and not

that an event would have been different.
It might be objected that this criticism does not
really

appiy to Kim's theory.

Suppose, continues the objector, that

someone introduces the following canonical notation to refer
to persons.
'a'

A person

names S's father,

S

is named by

'b'

time at which S was born.

'

[a,b,t

1

]

just in case

names S's mother, and t is the
'

This theory could adopt the

existence condition that [x,£,t] exists if and only if at t
y
delivers a child fathered by x.

And the following condition

of person-identity is forthcoming:

only if x=w, y=£, and t=t'

[x,y ' t] = [w , z , t

'

if and

But now it need not be a conse-

quence of this theory of naming persons that the time at

which a person is born is the only time at which that person
could have been born.

The fact that the time at which a

person is born is mentioned in the canonical name of the
person is irrelevant to whether it is essential to a person
that he be born at the time at which he actually is born.

Similarly, the objector might conclude, the fact that the
time at which Jones' speaking occurred is mentioned in the

canonical name of that event is irrelevant to whether that
event could have occurred at a different time.
I

think that we can see that this objection is mistaken.

Kim has not merely given us an ingenious device for naming
events analogous to the device just considered for naming
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persons.

Rather, Kim thinks that it is important that we

recognize that events are structured

— that

they reflect the

structure of the sentences by which we typically describe
them.

Thus, Kim's canonical notation is designed, in part,

to make explicit this structure.

There is no analogous

structural similarity between persons and the parent-timeof-birth names of the objector.

Furthermore, Kim says more

than that events are structurally similar to complexes con-

structed from names of objects, properties, and times.

He

says that events are complexes, consisting in the having of
a property by an object at a time 35
.

Thus,

I

think that the

criticism that Kim’s view has an implausible essentialist
consequence is not rebutted by this objection.

noted that

I

It should be

have not derived this essentialist view from

anything Kim has said.
it to his theory.

Thus,

I

may be mistaken in attributing

It might be that Kim has not told us

enough about his theory to tell whether his events could have

occurred at times other than the times at which they do occur.
In conclusion, we can admit that some support might be

found for Kim's theory of events by considering its usefulness
in dealing with particular problems, for example, causation
O

or mind-brain identity;

/T

although to examine these questions

would be beyond the scope of this work.

what we have seen of the theory,

I

Nevertheless, from

think that we can agree

that many problems need to be solved before Kim's theory
can be judged an adequate theory of events.
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7

.

Kim notes that the n! permutations on sequences of

length n form a group.
as a triple

(E,

°,

0)

,

Strictly, a group can be thought of

where E is a non-empty set,

°
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a binary

b
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'c'
i)

(a) (b) (c)

ii)

(a° (b°c) )=( (a°b) °c)

(0°a=a)

(a)

iii)

(

(a) (Ex)

(a°x) =0)

(
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3
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things,
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231.

am indebted to Fred Feldman for this example.

It

might be thought that the event in question, that is, the
event, e, of there being some stabbing event or other is
(ie) (Ex) (Ey) (Et)

(

[

(x,y

,

t)

,

stabs]=e)

.

But this formula

denotes a unique event just in case one individual stabs
one individual; and if, for example, the only stabbing in

some world is that of Caesar by Brutus, then in that world
the above formula picks out the event of Brutus stabbing

Caesar, and not the event of there being some stabbing event

But why not let the event in question be

or other.
(Ex) (Et)

(

[

(x, t)

or other]=e)?

,

(

•-}

e)

is such that there is some stabbing event

In order for this event to be one which

exists in all and only those worlds in which someone stabs
someone, let x= the number nine.
30

...
m

If one thinks that Jones could not have a pain

his

right foot without having the particular right foot that he
has, then having a pain in his right foot is mixed.

The

35

event should then be described as [(Jones, Jones' right
foot,
t)

,

x has a pain in
y]

foot.

.

Similar remarks hold for Jones' left

If Jones could have had a pain in his right foot while

possessing a different foot, what is the relation between the
event just mentioned and the monadic event mentioned in the
text?
31
32

On Kim's view the relation is not identity.
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33
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I
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Given that there is more than one choice available, we might

wonder whether there is a unique event
the text remains:

e.

The point made in

we are confronted with indefinitely many

candidates for the event which is the first performance of

Beethoven's Ninth.
34

This example is due to Fred Feldman.

We can assume, for

the sake of the discussion, that no two children of the same

parents are born simultaneously.
35

CCE 222, 226;

"Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical

Laws, and the Identity Theory", 182-185; C&E 438f.
36

For the former see C&E and CCE; for the latter see PPI

and the paper mentioned in note 32.
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CHAPTER

II

DAVIDSON'S ACCOUNT OF ACTION SENTENCES
In this chapter and the next

I

shall examine Donald

Davidson's treatment of the logical form of action sentences.

This chapter will be mainly expository; criticism

of Davidson's theory will come later.
I

In the first section

shall indicate the larger context against which Davidson's

treatment of action sentences may be seen as a working out
of details.

That larger context is Davidson's program of

giving a theory of meaning for English by defining a

Tarski-type truth predicate.

In the second section

shall

I

set out some of the details of Davidson's treatment of

action sentences.

In the third section

I

shall note two

restrictions on the range of application of Davidson's
novel treatment of adverbial modification.

Finally,

I

shall consider an objection to Davidson's account posed
by J, A. Fodor.

I

can cope with Fodor
1.

Davidson

'

s

shall argue that Davidson's theory
's

objection.

Program

.

Davidson's attempt to give the

logical form of action sentences is part of a general prog-

ram of giving a theory of meaning for English.

According

to Davidson, all that is required for a theory of meaning

for a language L is a theory which places enough restrictions on a predicate 'is T' to entail all true sentences of
the form
(T)

s

is T if and only if p,
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where
and

1
'

'p'

is a structural description of
a sentence of L

is replaced by that sentence

1
.

in effect, all

Davidson requires of a theory of meaning
is that it satisfy
Tarski's convention T for the adequacy
of a formal semantical definition of truth 2 As Davidson
puts it,
"the def-

.

inition works by giving necessary and
sufficient conditions
for the truth of every sentence, and
to give truth conditions for the truth of every sentence,
and to give truth
conditions is a way of giving the meaning of
a sentence. 3 "
Furthermore, Davidson thinks that any successful
definition
of

'is T*

will automatically reveal the semantically sig-

nificant structure of the sentences of the language.
Davidson apparently thinks that the revelation of
semantically significant structure is automatic, because "the
theory must work by selecting a finite number of truth-

affecting constructions from which all sentences are composed.

The theory then gives outright the semantic pro-

perties of certain of the basic expressions

,

and tells how

the constructions affect the semantic properties of the

expressions on which they operate.

4

A technique which Davidson employs in a first step
toward providing a truth definition for English is to translate certain English sentences into a canonical, extu.sional, first-order language.

If a technique can be found for

translating parts of English into such

a language,

then the

truth-definition of the formal language can be extended to
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include those English sentences which can be shown (by the

translation technique, perhaps) to have the same truth conditions as sentences of the formal language.

5

By trans-

lating fragments of English into a first-order language

Davidson hopes to bring those fragments within the scope of
a

recursive definition of truth, and hence within the scope

of a theory of meaning.

Davidson's account of the logical

form of action sentences, which consists in specifying a
canonical first-order language into which English action
sentences can be translated, can be seen as a first step
in a program of giving a theory of meaning for English.

Many questions might be raised at this point.
Is giving a Tarski-like truth-definition really all there

is to giving a theory of meaning?

Does every successful

definition of the truth predicate automatically reveal sig-

nificant semantic structure?

Can significant fragments of

English be mechanically translated into a first-order language?

I

propose to ignore these questions, however, and

plunge ahead with an investigation of Davidson's account of
My motivation for moving on is that even

action sentences.

if defining a truth predicate does not yield a theory of

meaning, translation of a troublesome fragment of English
into a canonical first-order language is interesting in
its own right, if only because the notion of logical con-

sequence for such a language is well understood.
2

.

Davidson

'

s

Account of Action Sentences

.

Davidson

begins his analysis of action sentences with a problem which
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Kenny has called the problem of the "variable polyadicity
of action verbs. 7

A typical account of the logical form

of

Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with a
knife at midnight

(1)

would make 'buttered' a five-place predicate taking, in this
case,

'Jones',

'the toast',

'midnight' as arguments.

'the bathroom',

'a

knife', and

The same approach would construe

'buttered' in

Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with a
knife

(2)

as a four-place predicate.

Similarly, in

Jones buttered the toast

(3)

'buttered' would be taken as a two-place predicate.

This

strategy has at least two drawbacks.

In the first place,

it fails to account for the fact that

(1)

entails

(2)

I

(3)

entails

(2)

and

shall call such inferences instances

of modifier elimination.

Secondly, it ignores the fact

that 'buttered' is a common syntactic element of each of
(1)

,

(2)

,

and

(3)

.

The ploy of taking
(3')

(3)

as elliptical for

Jones buttered the toast somewhere with something
at sometime

fares no better, for we seem to be able to add extra places
to the predicate at will.
'on January 20'.

For example, we could add to

(1)

Thus we do not seem to be able to tell in

general how many places an action verb should be construed
as having to accommodate all possible constructions.
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Davidson's solution is to suggest that verbs of action
contain an implicit place for singular terms referring to,
or variables ranging over, events.

Action sentences are

existential quantifications over events.

Thus,

Shem kicked Shaun

(4)

amounts, on Davidson's account, to
Shaun,

(Ex) (Kicked (Shem,

(5)

x)

)

.

which is read "There is an event x such that
of Shaun by Shem.

"

_x

is a kicking

In

Shem kicked Shaun behind the garage

(6)

Davidson would regard 'behind the garage' not as introducing
an additional place into the three-place predicate 'kicked'

but rather as qualifying any event satisfying the implicit

existential quantification.

Thus,

(Ex) (Kicked (Shem,

Shaun,

(7)

x)

That is

,

)

would be rendered as

(6)

x)

&

Behind (the garage,

.

"There is an event x such that x is a kicking of

Shaun by Shem and x occurred behind the garage."
In addition to showing that action verbs do not suffer

from "variable polyadicity "

,

Davidson's account has the

merit of showing that the inference of

(8)

(6)

is a

.

Given the truth of

Shem = the meanest kid on the block

it follows from
(9)

from

Moreover, the Davidsonian para-

matter of logical form.
phrases are extensional

(4)

(5)

that

(Ex) (Kicked (the
x)

)

.

meanest kid on the block, Shaun,
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Davidson regards this as an advantage because extensionality allows the possibility of giving a recursive
def-

inition of truth.
3.

Not All Grammatical Modifiers Get the Treatment.
"

’

\

Davidson's paraphrase of

(6)

positional phrase in

as a predicate demanding its own

conjunct.

(6)

relies on taking the pre-

For grammatical modifiers that can be so treated,

modifier elimination is clearly

a

matter of logical form.

Those modifiers which "introduce a new entity

instrument, or time)
Davidson.

"

(a

place, an

ought to be so treated, according to

Examples include, in addition to 'behind the

garage', the prepositional phrases of (1):
'with a knife', and 'at midnight'.

'in the bathroom,

Davidson explicitly

withholds his treatment from modifiers, such as 'slowly',
which might be called "adverbs of manner".

Davidson

suggests that ’Susan crossed the Channel slowly' should not
be understood as

'There is an event of Susan's crossing the

Channel and it was slow'; for Susan's crossing might have

been a fast swimming.

If Davidson's treatment of gram-

matical modifiers applied to 'slowly' and 'fast', he would
be committed to holding that Susan's crossing the Channel
(which in the case described Davidson identifies with

Susan's swimming the Channel) was both slow and fast.

This

difficulty is similar to the one involved in giving the
logical role of 'small* in 'Bimbo is a small elephant',
given that Bimbo is not small for a mammal.
to treat

'small'

We do not want

as an independent predicate requiring its
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own clause, for then we could infer that Bimbo is
an elephant and he is small and he is a mammal and he is
not
small.

Since this problem is not unique to modifiers in

action sentences, Davidson thinks that he can ignore
it.

Davidson also declines to treat such adverbs as 'deliberately' or 'intentionally' as predicates of events.
His reason here is that "intentional actions are not
a class

of actions

8

To say that an action is intentional is

.

according to Davidson, "to describe the action in

a way

that bears a special relation to the beliefs and attitudes
of the agent." 9

Davidson sometimes speaks of an action

being intentional "under a description", by which he apparently means to express a relation between an agent, an
event, and a description.

I

shall postpone discussion of

this topic.

Exactly which adverbial modifiers are to be treated as

predicates?

Are there modifiers in addition to adverbs of

manner and adverbs imputing intention to which Davidson's
treatment ought not be extended?
to these questions.

I

do not know the answer

My intent in this section is merely to

call attention to these restrictions and to suggest that

they should be born in mind while assessing Davidson's

claims to have given a theory of adverbial modification."^
4.

Sentential vs

.

Verbal Modifiers

.

Fodor claims

that some modifiers ought in some contexts be construed
as modifying an entire sentence and in other contexts be
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construed as modifying a verb phrase.
least)

"English acknowledges

two kinds of relations between an adverbial

phrase and the other structures in a sentence which contains it.

The adverbial phrase may modify the entire sen-

tence, or it may modify (just)

tence." 11

the verb phrase of the sen-

Fodor further claims that Davidson's notation is

only able to capture at most one of these two kinds of con-

structions.

He suggests that this is a serious difficulty

for Davidson,

"that Davidson's theory is at best insuf-

ficiently rich to account for the full range of types of
relations that English allows between events [sic] and
their modifiers." 12
I

shall consider two of the examples with which Fodor

attempts to support his claims.

I

shall suggest with res-

pect to each of them that they can be handled within
Davidson's notation, and thus,

I

shall conclude that Fodor

has not found a serious difficulty with Davidson's analysis.

Fodor first considers the following sentences.
(10)

John spoke clearly,

(11)

John spoke, clearly,

(12)

Clearly, John spoke.

Fodor notes that 'clearly' in
while in (11) and
'John spoke'.

(12)

(10)

modifies the verb 'spoke',

'clearly' modifies the sentence

Thus, the logical form of (10) ought to

differ from the logical form of

(11)

and (12)

.

Fodor then

claims that the only relevant translation available to
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(13) is
Davidson
(Ex) (Spoke (John,

Fodor concludes that
(12)

,

(13)

x)

Clearly (x)).

&

might be an analysis of

but as an analysis of

(10)

,

(11)

and

"it would appear to be a
\

non-starter.

Fodor does seem to be correct in claiming that
'

clearly

*

can modify either a

verb phrase or a sentence.

We might take note of some differences in the two con-

structions.

As a verbal modifier,

'clearly' is a com-

parative, and suffers from a difficulty noted above 13 in

connection with the adverb 'slowly'

.

As Fodor is aware,

John might speak clearly for someone with his mouth full of

marbles

but unclearly for someone who has taken five years

,

of elocution lessons.

As a sentential modifier,

also functions as a comparative.

more clear than another.

'clearly'

One sentence might be

But the sentential modifier

'clearly* is also incomplete in a certain respect.

tences are often clear to someone.
be clear to Saul Kripke

,

Thus, a sentence might

but unclear to the rest of us.

Finally, as a sentential modifier,
inducing.

'clearly' is opacity-

Given appropriate assumptions,

(14)

Clearly, Cicero wrote Cicero's Orations

(15)

Cicero = Marcus Tullius

are true

,

(16)

is false.

Sen-

,

and

although
Clearly, Marcus Tullius wrote Cicero's Orations
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One reply which Davidson might make to Fodor's
objection is that comparatives, like

constructions,

'slowly' and

'clearly' in both of its

'small', among others, were ex-

plicitly excluded from his account of action sentences, on
the ground that the problems such words raise are not

unique to their occurrences in action sentences.

Fodor

claims, however, that his objection does not depend on the

comparative feature of the adverb 'clearly', and if there
are adverbial phrases not excluded by Davidson which do

function as both verbal and sentential modifiers

problem will have to be faced at some point.

,

the

So let us

see whether Davidson has a more satisfying reply.

Fodor claimed that
(13)

(Ex) (Spoke (John,

x)

&

Clearly

(x))

analyzes
(12)

Clearly, John spoke

(11)), and that

(or

(10)

John spoke clearly

is left unanalyzed by Davidson's theory.

the translation of (12)

rather than (10)?

Why take

'x'

in

is naturally replaced by a nominalized sentence, for

example,
in

as

Fodor is ap-

parently led to do so by noting that the variable
(13)

(13)

(13)

'John's speaking'.

14

Thus, Fodor thinks

is a modifier of a sentence

one), and so (13)

translates

(12)

(albeit a nominalized

in which

functions as a sentential modifier.

'clearly'

I

'clearly'

think that this line
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of reasoning is misleading.

in the first place, nominal-

ized sentences are not the only natural
replacements for

event variables.

Other candidates include singular terms

and definite descriptions, for example,
and

the first speech John made'

.

'Super Bowl VII'

But more importantly,

Fodor seems to have confused the metalinguistic predicate
'Clearly'

clearly

'

of (13) with the object language adverb

That the former can take as argument a nom-

.

inalized sentence is not by itself grounds for thinking
that it translates the sentence-modifying use of the
latter.

In fact, it is up to Davidson to tell us what the

metalinguistic predicate 'Clearly' translates, since it is
not, after all, English.

To see that the distinction is

important, consider Davidson's paraphrase of
(17)

I

flew my spaceship to the Morning Star,

which is
(Ex) (Flew (I, my spaceship, x)
Star, x)

(17a)

&

To(the Morning

)

Now entails
(18)

If

(18)

(Ex) (To (the

is read as

Morning Star, x

)

'There is something to the Morning Star',

it is patently nonsense.

The temptation to so read (18)

is

lessened if it is realized that the metalinguistic predicate 'To' occurring in (18) is something other than the

object language preposition 'to' occurring in (17).
course,

(17a)

Of

does not make sense until it is given sense,

and part of what is involved in doing that is defining the
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metalinguistic predicate 'To'.

We may suppose Davidson to

have done this by saying that 'To(x,£)' is
satisfied by

pair <a,b> just in case b is an event involving
motion
toward and terminating at a. 16 it would be
inappropriate,
a

however, to render
(19)

Privatus dedicated his poem to the Morning Star"^

as
(19a)

(Ex) (Dedicated (Privatus
Morning Star, x)
)

since Privatus

'

,

his poem, x)
~

&

To

dedicating presumably did not involve

motion toward and terminating at the Morning Star.
account for

(19)

(the

,

To

Davidson will have to introduce a new

binary metalinguistic predicate, perhaps 'To^'

correspond-

ing to the object language preposition 'to' of (30).
if b is an event involving dedicating to a,

hold of the pair <a,b>.

'

To

'

d

Then

will

Davidson's task is enormously more

complicated than it might initially have seemed.

responding to the preposition

'to'

For cor-

he will have to have

several, perhaps many, metalinguistic predicates, one for

each of the many distinct uses of the preposition.

A sim-

ilar point holds, generally, for every English word that
admits of a variety of uses

.

But then it seems unlikely

that English could ever be mechanically translated into

Davidson's canonical notation.

Worse, it seems unlikely

that we could non-trivially give a semantics for English
by first translating it into a canonical notation like

Davidson’s and then giving a semantics for the canonical
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notation.

For, in order to decide, for example, whether

an English sentence including the preposition

'to'

should

go over into a canonical sentence including the
predicate
'To',

'To

d

',

or some other predicate, we must already know
*

what the English sentence means.
the preposition

predicate

f

'to

1

If all occurrences of

were translated by one metalinguistic

we might hope that the translation procedure

could be purely syntactic.

But since, as we have seen,

several metalinguistic predicates are needed to handle the

various uses of the English preposition, it seems likely
that a purely syntactic translation procedure would be un-

workable

.

To return to the question of whether (13)
(12)

(13)

r

I

translates

have suggested that the fact that the variable in

is replaceable by a nominalized sentence is no ground

for thinking that (13)
use of 'clearly'.

I

captures the sentential modifier

have also suggested that it is up to

Davidson to define the metalinguistic predicate 'Clearly'.
If both of these claims are correct, we can go on to imag-

ine that Davidson has told us that the metalinguistic

open sentence
<a>

'

Clearly

(x)

'

is satisfied by a unary sequence

just in case a is an event involving sound or speech

that is distinctly perceptible.
(13)

(Ex) (Spoke (John

,

x)

&

Then,

Clearly

(x)

is most naturally construed as translating
(10)

John spoke clearly,
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where 'clearly' is a verbal modifier.
How then could Davidson translate
(12)

Clearly, John spoke,

where 'clearly' is a sentential modifier?
a

and

(11)

I

suggest that

plausible treatment would be
(20)

Clearly

(

(Ex) (Spoke (John

It might be objected that,

,

x)

)

)

.

as noted above,

'clearly' as

a sentential modifier is opacity-inducing.

context created by 'Clearly' in
and thus

(20)

(20)

If it is, the

is non-extensional

is not available to Davidson, who requires

that action sentences be translated into an extensional

first-order language.
This objection is not serious, however.

For (20) is

surely synonomous with
(21)

It is clear that

((Ex) (Spoke (John, x)

If we make the further assumption that

(20)

19

.

and (21) have

the same logical form, we are near a solution.

has given an account of indirect discourse

)

Davidson

according to

which a sentence such as 'Galileo said that the earth
moves

'

is represented as split into two semantic parts

Galileo said that.
The earth moves
The first sentence consists of the name of a subject, a

two-place predicate, and a demonstrative which refers to
the second sentence.

of what Galileo said.

The second sentence gives the content
In a similar way, Davidson could

\
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regard (21) as composed of the following two parts:
That is clear.

(or,

(Ex) (Spoke (John,

x)

It is clear that.)

)

The first sentence consists of a one-place predicate and
a

demonstrative referring to the second sentence, which is

what is said to be clear. 20
am not claiming either that Davidson's account of

I

indirect discourse is in fact ultimately successful or
that his account of indirect discourse can be applied

successfully to other constructions, such as 'It is clear
that,

,
.

'

.

All

I

wish to claim is that this maneuver is

open to Davidson and that it is not, on the face of it,

unreasonable.

But if this is correct, then Fodor is

mistaken in claiming that Davidson's notation cannot
formulate both

(10)

and (12)

Fodor gives another example which he claims poses a

problem for Davidson,

Since this example is different in

certain respects from the previous case, it is worth ex-

amining separately.
(22)

Fodor suggests that

John aimed his gun at the target

is ambiguous.

Fodor claims that

(22)

can answer the

question 'What did John aim his gun at?', in which case
he represents its structure as
(23)

John ((aimed) at the target) his gun.

Fodor says that

(22)

can also answer the question 'Where

did John do his gun aiming?
its structure as

'

,

in which case he represents
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(24)

At the target (John aimed his gun)

Fodor thinks that the adverbial phrase 'at the target' can
modify a verb, as it does according to the structural
analysis

(23), or it can modify a sentence, as it does

according to

(24)

Fodor suggests that the only para-

phrase available to Davidson's theory is
(25)

(Ex) (Aimed (John,

his gun,

x)

&

At (the target,

x) T,

Finally, Fodor claims that (25) is a paraphrase of at

most one of the two readings of

(22)

,

and thus there are

some action sentences which Davidson's theory cannot

express

A reply which Davidson would be unwilling to make

would be to claim that

(22)

under interpretation

is best translated by the primitive predicate

Thus

'Aimed-at'.

,

(26)

(Ex)

(Aimed-at (John

,

his gun, the target,

This reply could then accept (25)
(22)

(23)

under interpretation (24).

x)

)

.

as the translation of

But, taking 'Aimed-at'

as an unstructured predicate would obscure the fact that

'aimed'

is a common syntactic element of both variants

of (22) and that 'at' is a common syntactic element of
'aim at',
at'

'look at',

'point at',

'shoot at', and 'shout

22
.

A reply which Davidson might make is the following.
He could admit that

(22)

is ambiguous and that

the only translation of (22)

(25)

in his notation, while

is
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maintaining that

(25)

is itself ambiguous, but harmlessly

There is some textual evidence for attributing such
a move to Davidson.
"As long as ambiguity does not affect
so.

grammatical form, and can be translated, ambiguity for
ambiguity, into the metalanguage, a truth definition will
not tell any lies. 23

However, it is Fodor

the ambiguity of (22)

does affect its grammatical form.

'

s

claim that

So unless it can be shown that the ambiguity of (22) does

not affect its grammatical form, this reply does not seem
to be available to Davidson.
(27)

Moreover,

At the target, John aimed his gun

is unambiguous and seems to be translated by

If

(25).

(25)

were ambiguous, Davidson's theory would translate an unambiguous sentence,

(27), by an ambiguous one,

there seems to be something wrong with that.

that we look for another way out of Fodor

'

s

So

suggest

I

objection.

do not think that we need to look very far.

I

and

(25),

All

we need to do is notice that under interpretation (23)
'at'

has the sense of 'in the direction of', while under

interpretation
or by'.

(24)

'at'

has the sense of 'occurring near

Davidson can simply introduce into the meta-

language two predicates, perhaps 'At

'

1
'

At ^

',

with

translating the former sense of 'at' and 'At 2

lating the latter.
well:

and 'At Z9

24

'At^'

'

t.rans-

would serve other purposes, as

it would figure in translations of such phrases as

'point at',

'look at'# and 'shoot at'.

Finally, this way of avoiding Fodor 's objection seems
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to deny the claim that

under interpretation

'at the target'

(24)

as a sentential modifier.

that seems to be all right.

regard

at the hop

(28)

1

functions in (22)

I

But

feel little inclination to

as a sentential modifier in

Danny lost his date at the hop,

yet the constructions are parallel.

So

I

conclude that

Fodor has not uncovered any serious expressive inadequacy
in Davidson's theory.
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CHAPTER III
MORE ABOUT ACTION SENTENCES
In this chapter

I

shall offer some criticisms of

Davidson's account of action sentences.

I

shall first note

that there are some inferences not accounted
for by

Davidson's theory.

While this need not be taken as a

criticism of Davidson's claims about the logical
form of
action sentences, it should raise some questions
concerning
the relation between an account of logical
form and a

theory of meaning.
i_he

Next,

I

shall consider an objection to

effect tha^ Davidson's theory is inadequate for giving

the logical form of certain sentences which describe
an

agent doing two things at once.

attempted solution

I

shall consider an

to this objection.

Discussion of the

attempted solution will yield, in the third section of
this chapter, the discovery of a problem of variable poly-

adicity for prepositions.

This in turn might raise some

doubts about Davidson's treatment of prepositional phrases.

Finally,

I

inadequate.

shall suggest that the attempted solution is
I

shall thus conclude that Davidson's account

of the logical form of action sentences is inadequate.
1

.

Some Inferences

.

There are some inferences which

are unaccounted for by Davidson's theory.

although
(1)

entails

I

sang the National Anthem

For example,
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(2)

I

sang,
\

Davidson's formulation of these as
(Ex) (Sang (I,

(la)

the National Anthem,

x)

)

and
(Ex) (Sang (I

(2a)

,

x)

is of no help in explaining the inference.

The difficulty

is that Davidson takes transitive verbs to express three-

place predicates and intransitive verbs to express twoplace predicates.
a sentence like

Given this, it is difficult to see how

(1),

containing a transitive verb, could,

as a matter of logical form, entail a corresponding sen-

tence like (2), which contains an intransitive verb.

Castaneda's solution’'" is to split transitive verbs
into a conjunction of binary predicates, each of which

expresses the same relation.

This relation holds both

between the agent and an event and between the patient or
object and event.
(3)

I

Thus, to use Castaneda's example,

flew my spaceship

becomes
(Ex)(Flew(I,

(3a)

x)

Flew(my spaceship, x

&

)

)

Given that
(4)

I

flew

is represented as
(4a)

(Ex) (Flew (I

,

x)

Castaneda regards taking

)

(3)

it makes the entailment of

as

(4)

(3a)

by

(3)

as advantageous since
a matter of form.
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However, not all transitive verbs are such that
sentences

containing them entail a corresponding sentence containing
a corresponding intransitive verb.
(5)

I

sank the Bismarck

(6)

I

sank

As Davidson notes,

and
(4)

are of the same logical form as

not entail
,

(3)

and (4), but

In fact, it is doubtful that

(6)

(5)

does

entails

(3)

since
(7)

I

flew my model airplane

clearly does not.

Thus, while adopting Castaneda's revision

allows us to account for the inference of

from

(2)

(1)

it

,

also justifies many fallacious inferences.

Another inference which Davidson's theory misses is
the inference from
(8)

(5)

to

The Bismarck sank.

Again,
we might not want to attribute this inference to
(5)

logical form, since
(9)

The Queen dissolved the Parliament

and
(10)

The Parliament dissolved

are of the same logical form as

not entail
,

(10)

.

and

yet

(9)

does

Nevertheless, the inference of

(8)

from

as well as the inference of

(5)

(2)

(8)

from

(1)

,

depends,

at least in part, upon the meanings of the verbs involved.

But Davidson's projected theory of meaning will igno:

aspect of the meaning of these sentences.

Davidson's

o

this
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theory of meaning would tell us how to find the
truth
values of these sentences given assignments to
their

component parts; it would not tell us that for
each pair
these truth values are connected.
2.

Doing Two Things at Once

A more serious difficulty

.

for Davidson's theory involves cases in which an
agent does

two things at once.

John Wallace.

One such problem is attributed to

Suppose that while playing pool, John,

with one stroke of the cue, sends the cue ball into the
three and five balls.

The three ball then hits the eight

ball into the side pocket, and the five ball sends the nine
ball into the corner pocket.
(11)

Then,

John hit the eight ball into the corner pocket
with the three ball and the nine ball into the
side pocket with the five ball.

The natural way to translate (11) into Davidson's notation
is as
(11a)

(Ex) (Hit (John, the eight ball, x) & Into (the
corner pocket, x) & With (the three ball, x)
& Hit (John, the nine ball, x)
& Into (the
side pocket, x) & With (the five ball, x)
)

But (11a)

entails not only that John hit the eight ball

into the corner pocket, as it should, but also that he did
it with the three ball, and that he did it with the nine

ball, and that he did it into the side pocket.
is inadequate as a translation of

Thus,

(11a)

(11)

A revision of Davidson's account which is designed to

keep track of what is done to whom with what is to introduce
a

place in the predicate translating a preposition for the
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(11)
oiroct
°t>ject of the verb.

Accordingly, we could translate

as
(lib)

(Ex) (Hit (John, the eight ball, x) &
Into (the
corner pocket, the eight ball, x) & With (the
three ball, the eight ball, x) & Hit (John,
the nine ball, x) & Into (the side pocket,
the nine ball, x) & With (the five ball, the
nine ball x)
,

)

.

Now (lib) does not entail that John hit the eight
ball into

both the corner and side pockets.

Nor does (lib) entail

that John hit the eight ball with both the three and the
five balls.

And so sentences like

re<?<^ded ss

(11)

need not be

a serious threat to Davidson's theory,

if we

^^vise Davidson's theory along the lines suggested.
3.

Variable Polyadicity and Prepositional Predicate s

.

There is a minor difficulty with the method of introducing
a

place in the predicates expressed by prepositions to be

filled with the direct object of the verb, and that is
that prepositions now suffer from variable polyadicity.

For the same preposition can occur in sentences with in-

transitive verbs as well as in sentences with transitive
verbs

.

Thus

,

consider

(12)

Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife, and

(13)

Brutus stabbed with a knife.

The first of these sentences would be formulated according
to the revised theory we are now considering as
(12a)

(Ex) (Stabbed (Brutus
Caesar, x)

,

Caesar,

x)

&

With

(a

knife,

)

The revised theory does not say what to do with

(13)

.

The
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natural paraphrase is
(13a)

(Stabbed (Brutus,

(Ex)

x)

&

With

(a

knife,

But now 'With' is a three-place
predicate in (12a)

two-place predicate in (13a).

x)

)

and a

Davidson's theory was motiv-

ated by a desire to escape the problem
of variable polyadacity for verbs; it would not be much of a
gain to escape
that problem at the expense of accepting a
theory that was

committed to the variable polyadicity of prepositions.
It might be replied that Davidson has not
entirely

avoided construing verbs as having variable polyadicity.

After all, verbs taking
place predicate

,

a

direct object express a three-

while verbs without a direct object

express a two-place predicate.

It would only be fitting,

this reply would continue, to take prepositions in
sen-

tences with a direct object as expressing a predicate of
one more place than they would express in sentences without
a direct object.

But even if we agree with Davidson that prepositions
are best treated as predicates, there is no intuitive

motivation for thinking that our ordinary prepositions
vary in any way corresponding to the variance in number of

places just described.

Furthermore, the analogy between

the limited variable polyadicity of verbs and the limited

variable polyadicity of prepositions under consideration
breaks down when it is realized that the number of places
in a predicate expressed by a preposition can be increased

indefinitely.

Consider,
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sailed with Alice and Betsy and Carol
and Donna
Given that (14) and its obvious
extensions are intended to
express a single sailing, their
translations must look
something like
(14)

^

I

14a
^

Do

The predicate

^ '—

~

With (Alice

&

)

,

Betsy, Carol,

‘With' now looks to be fully variably
poly-

adic.

The problem of increasing places in
prepositional

predicates can be resolved by simply taking one
place to
be filled by a set which can be of any
cardinality. 4

Thus,

(14)

would become
(14b)

(Ex) (Sailed(I,x)
~
Donna?, x)

&

With(}Alice, Betsy, Carol

)

This maneuver suggests a similar device for handling
the variable polyadicity of prepositional predicates
re-

sulting from the presence or absence of a direct object.
We simply stipulate that each predicate expressed by a

preposition have a place filled by an expression designating
the set containing the direct object, if there is one. 5
If there is no direct object, the place which in other

contexts might be filled by a set containing a direct

object is occupied by a symbol designating the null set.
Thus,

(12)

(13b)

and (13) become
(Ex) (Stabbed (Brutus
Caesar,
knFfe], £Caesarf, x)
,

x)

&

With (£a

)

and
(14b)

(Ex) (Stabbed (Brutus

,

x)

&

With([a knife}, A,

x)

)
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Prepositional predicates can now each be regarded
as having
a fixed number of places.
Of course, the devices
just con-

sidered are entirely ad hoc.
However, not only are these devices ad hoc:

not entirely satisfactory.
(14)

they are

For

I

sailed with Alice and Betsy and Carol and Donna

I

sailed with Alice.

entails
(15)

Treating

(14)

(14b)

and (15)

as

(Ex) (Sailed (I,
Donna }, A, x)

x)

&

With(fAlice, Betsy, Carol,

(Sailed (I,

x)

&

With

as

(15b)

(Ex)

obscures this inference.

([

Alice], A

,

x

)

)

We could adopt a special rule

written schematically as follows
(PS)

Where 'Prep' is any prepositional predicate and
A and B are sets such that B^A, from r (Ex)
(Prep (A x) )~* infer r (Ex) (Prep (B x) P
,

,

.

This rule would account for the inference of (15)

but it would sanction illicit inferences, as well.

from (14)

,

For

example
(16)

chose among Alice, Betsy, etc.

I

does not entail
(17)

chose among Alice,

I

but (PS) would justify such an inference.

A natural step to take at this point would be to
treat (14) as elliptical for
(14')

I

sailed with Alice and with Betsy and with Carol
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and with Donna.

Then (14)
(14c)

could be represented in Davidson's notation as
(Ex) (Sailed (I
(t

x)

Betsy
)

}

,

x)

,

&

x) & With QAliceJ, x) & With
with (£Carol}
x) & With (£ Donna}
,

.«

If we accept this formulation, the appropriate entailments

will hold.

tended to

This treatment could not, of course, be ex(16)

But then is there a uniform treatment of

,

prepositions available to Davidson?
Suppose that prepositions divide neatly into those for

which inferences like the one from

(14)

to

(15)

hold and

those for which such inferences fail.

For example,

and 'by' might be in the former class,

'among'

in the latter.

'with'

and 'between'

Then Davidson could require that all pre-

positional predicates take a set-expression in their first
argument-place, and he could adopt a version of

(PS)

re-

stricted to just those prepositions for which the relevant
inference holds

.

Or he could require that only those

prepositions in the second class always take a set-expression in their first argument-place, but that prepositions
in the first class yield to conjunctions, in the manner of
(14c)

,

when they appear to take

a

plurality of objects.

But it is not clear that prepositions can be so neatly
divided.
(18)

For example, it seems to me that
John was poisoned with arsenic and milk

does not entail
(19)

John was poisoned with milk.
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But then

with

is in both classes of prepositions, since

the inference of (15)

from (14) does hold.

But,

finally,

if prepositions cannot be divided exclusively into those

for which

(PS)

holds and those for which it does not,

I

can think of no way in which Davidson’s treatment of

prepositions can both be applied in cases in which a

preposition appears to take more than one object and also
yield an account of the correct instances of
4.

Conclus ion

In section

,

2

(PS)

we considered revising

Davidson's theory to accommodate cases in which two things
are done at once.

That revision consisted in introducing

into prepositional predicates a place for an expression

designating the set of the direct object

(s)

of a sentence.

Unfortunately, this revision is inadequate to handle all

Wallace-type objections.

For how can the following

sentence be adequately translated?
Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back with a knife
and in the chest with an ice pick.

(20)

If we assume that

(20)

is intended to report a single

action, it is not equivalent to the conjunction

Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back with a knife
and Brutus stabbed Caesar in the chest with an
ice pick,

(21)

which could be true if Brutus did his back-stabbing on a

different occassion than his chest-stabbing.
available

9

(20a)

So the only

way of translating (20) seems to be as
Caesar, x) & In ithe back?,
x) &
£Caesar?, x & With(£a knife?, £ Caesar!
In [the chest!, [Caesar?, x) & With(£an ice pick!,
[Caesar? x)
(Ex) (Stabbed (Brutus

,

(

,

(

,

)

68

But now (20a)

,

unlike (20)

entails that Brutus stabbed

Caesar in the back with an ice pick and that Brutus stabbed
Caesar in the chest with a knife.

adequate paraphrase of (20).

So

(20a)

is not an

Thus, apart from the dif-

ficulties involving prepositions considered in section
I

conclude that Davidson's theory, even as revised, is

inadequate to give the logical form of all action
sentences

3,
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Notes to Chapter III
1

"Comments on D. Davidson's

'The Logical Form of

Action Sentences'" in N. Rescher, ed.

,

The Logic of

Decision and Action (Pittsburgh, 1966) :104-112.
2

3

I

Cf.
I

Ch

.

II,

Sec.

1,

above.

do not know if this objection has been published.

am indebted to Greg Fitch for bringing this problem to

my attention and for suggesting the attempted solution (lib)
4

This strategy is inspired by a similar device adopted

by Castaneda, p. 107.

\

^Castaneda has suggested that the place for the direct

object in the predicate expressed by a transitive verb be
filled by an expression designating the set containing the

direct object.

This will accommodate sentences which have

more than one direct object
set.

I

-

they can all be put into a

do not discuss such cases, but the suggestion in

the text is clearly amenable to Castaneda's treatment.
^I

am indebted to Gareth B. Matthews for pointing

this out.
7

Note that there is an analogous complication for verbs

g

The brackets surrounding each name are optional.

simplicity,

I

For

have omitted the place for the null set in

each prepositional predicate.
9

I

give the only available way of translating

(20)

according to the revised version of Davidson's theory.
assume that the problem raised in trying to translate

I

(11)
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is sufficient to refute the
unmodified theory.

ly.

(20)

as well.

Incidental-

raises difficulties for the unmodified
theory.
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CHAPTER

IV

DAVIDSON'S THEORY OF EVENTS

Davidson accepts a coarse-grained
theory of events
Where others see several or many
events Davidson

sees only

/

one.

Thus,

m

"Actions, Reasons and Causes" he says

tUrn ° n thS light and illuminate
th^rncl^
the
room.
Unbeknownst to me I also alert a prowler
f C
th fc 1 am home
Here 1 do not d o four
K
^
n ? Y ° n ® f ° f Which f ° Ur desc riptions
9
have
been
'

*

given?l°

It seems clearly to be Davidson's
view that in the case

described, not merely is there only one
thing which I do.
but there is only one event
My flipping the switch is the
.

same event as my turning on the light, which
is the same
event as my illuminating the room, which is
the same event
as my alerting the prowler.

Elsewhere Davidson writes

That the bullet pierced the victim was a consequence
of my pointing the gun and pulling the trigger.
It
is clear that these are two different events,
since
one began slightly after the other.
But what is the
relation between my pointing the gun and pulling the
trigger, and my shooting the victim? The natural and,
I think, correct answer is that the relation
is that
of identity 2
.

While Kim would hold that there are at least two events here,
my having the property of pointing the gun and pulling the

trigger at a particular time, and my having the property of

shooting the victim at a particular time, Davidson thinks
that there is just one.

My pointing the gun and pulling the

just i^ my shooting the victim.
In this chapter

I

shall present some considerations which
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Davidson produces in support of his view, and

I

shall consider

\

Davidson's condition of event-identity.

I

shall claim that

neither his positive support nor his identity
condition requires that events be coarse-grained. Next I shall
state

three objections to Davidson's theory, two of which

convincing.

In an appendix

I

Events

Support for the Theory

.

3

find

shall return to the topic,

postponed in earlier chapters, of action "under
1

I

.

a description".

in "The Individuation of

Davidson offers six considerations which he says are

'good reasons for taking events seriously as entities".

Since Davidson is concerned in that article to defend a

principle of event individuation which he thinks individuates
events coarsely, it is tempting to believe that Davidson regards these six considerations not merely as "reasons

...

for

accepting an explicit ontology of events" but as providing
support for individuating events coarsely.

That temptation

is enhanced by the fact that Davidson seems to have given

no other reasons for preferring a coarse-grained individuation
of events.

siderations.

In this section

I

shall briefly list these con-

In the next section

shall try to indicate

I

how they might be supposed to support a coarse-grained ap-

proach to event individuation, and

I

shall claim that they

do not in fact support such an approach.

Davidson says first that events are needed for
of action.

a

theory

"It is hard to imagine a satisfactory theory of

action if we cannot talk literally of the same action under
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different descriptions."

He goes on to give an example
of

what he thinks is one action under
two descriptions.
"Jones
managed to apologize by saying, 'x apologize';
but only because under the circumstances, saying
'I apologize'
was

apologizing.

Davidson also suggests that we need events to
give an
account of excuses.
"Cedric intentionally burned the scrap
of paper; this serves to excuse his
burning a valuable

document only because he did not know the scrap was
the
uocument and because his burning the scrap was

(identical

with)

his burning the document."

point more explicitly elsewhere.
excuse that

'I

Davidson makes the same
To account for Jones'

didn't know the gun was loaded' while admitting

pointing the gun and pulling the trigger, but denying
culpability for shooting the victim, Davidson thinks we should
appeal to the following "logical structure" of excusing:
admit

I

did

.a,

which is excusable.

rests upon my claim that

I

My excuse for doing b

did not know that a=b " 4

Thus,

Jones admits to pointing the gun and pulling the trigger,

but he denies having known that his pointing the gun and
pulling the trigger would be the same as his shooting the
victim.

Davidson also claims that accounts of explanation and
causation require events.

First, explanation:

Explanation, as already hinted, also seems to call
for events.
Last week there was a catastrophe in
the village.
In the course of explaining why it

"i
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happened we need to redescribe
it, perhaps as an

SrX;."*"

”

"i.

And in the same passage he
mentions causation:
h

ause
^use

n lt 0 n in ° nG WaY ° r another
the
o?f *L
^
'u
o
the avalanche,
we apparently claim that

V

'

^

though we may not know such a
description or such
there must be descriptions of cause
and
deSCri P tio
instantiate
law"'
'

Hrue^af

-

Davidson then adds a point about both
explanation and causation.

"All this talk of descriptions and
redescriptions makes
sense, it would seem, only on the
assumption that there are
bona fide entities to be described and

redescribed."

As a fifth consideration in favor of
particular events

Davidson suggests that the mere intelligibility
of the Identity
Theory requires that there be events. He says,
"A further
need for events springs from the fact that the
most perspicuous
forms of the identity theory of mind require that
we identify

mental events with certain physiological events; if such
theories or their denials are intelligible, events must be

individuals

.

Finally, and most importantly, Davidson thinks that

without events it does not seem possible to give a
natural and acceptable account of the logical form
of certain sentences of the most common sort; it
does not seem possible, that is, to show how the
meanings of such sentences depend upon their composition
.

The sorts of sentences Davidson has in mind are action

sentences, and the "natural and acceptable" account is the
one we considered in Chapters II and III.

That is, Davidson
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thinks that his account of action
sentences requires that
there be particular events.
2.

C riticism of the Support .

Davidson speaks of the

six considerations of the last section
as grounds for thinking
that events are particulars.
I am not convinced that they
are
compelling grounds in favor of particular
events, but I shall
not discuss that here.
The question I am interested in is

whether there is any reason for individuating
events coarsely,
and, in particular, whether any of these
considerations pro-

vide such a reason.

Despite the fact that the topics of

action, excuses, explanation, and the Identity Theory
are

well beyond the scope of this essay, so that we can
discuss
none of them in detail,

I

think that we shall be able to

agree that none of the considerations Davidson presents

supports his view of event individuation.

Consider first what Davidson says about excuses.

In

Davidson's example Jones admits to pointing the gun and

pulling the trigger but denies responsibility for shooting
the victim on the grounds that he did not know that the gun

was loaded.

Davidson thinks that to understand this pattern

of excusing we should regard Jones as denying that he knew

that his pointing the gun and pulling the trigger would be
the same event as his shooting the victim, although in fact

they were the same event.

We can accept this basic structure,

however, without admitting that the relation of identity
holds between the event of Jones' pointing the gun and
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pulling the trigger and the event of Jones'
shooting the
victim.
We could instead hold that by_ pointing

the gun and

pulling the trigger Jones shot the victim.

What Jones

claims to have been ignorant of, then, is that his
shooting
the victim would have the by-relation to his pointing
the

gun and pulling the trigger

5
.

More needs to be said, of

course, about the nature of this by-relation, and more will
be said, below.

For the moment it suffices to note that we

often do speak of doing one thing by doing another, for
example, opening the window by turning the knob, replenishing the water supply by operating the pump, or turning on
the light by flipping the switch, and it seems plausible to

suppose that in such cases we assert that events of a certain

sort exist and are related by the by-relation.

Consider next Davidson's identification of Jones'
saying

apologize' with Jones' apologizing.

'I

plausibility to this identification.
said,

'I

There is some

After all, when Jones

apologize* he did not have to do anything else to

apologize.

And anyone who heard Jones say

would have heard him apologize.

'I

Nevertheless,

apologize'
I

lieve that this identification is forced upon us.

do not beIf we

recognize that there is such a thing as a by-relation, we
do not have to identify Jones'

saying

'I

apologizing with Jones'

apologize' in order to understand the claim that

Jones apologized by saying

'I

apologize'.

Rather, we simply

say that there is an event of Jones' apologizing and an
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event of Jones' saying

'I

apologize', and the former bears

the by-relation to the latter.

Thus, Davidson's first

consideration does not seem to require
that events be
individuated coarsely.
It is less clear to me how Davidson's
third and fourth

considerations bear on the question of
event individuation.
If the point simply is that
accounts of explanation
and

causation require description and redescription
of events,
then it does not count in favor of
coarse-grained events.
For fine-grained events can be described.

redescribed

,

as well;

for example,

ing in the relation of stabbing at

event

And they can be

’Brutus and Caesar standt'

and 'Kim's most-cited

might be two descriptions of the same fine-grained

event.

Perhaps, instead, the point is something like the following.

Suppose that an explanation of an event

deductive argument such that

e is

a

its premiss set is the union

1)

of a set, C, of propositions stating various matters of fact

and standing conditions, and a set, L, of propositions

stating various causal laws,

proposition that

e

its conclusion is the

2)

occurred, and

deducible from C or L alone.

3)

the conclusion is not

Suppose, then, that we want

to explain the catastrophe in the village.

What we will

have to do is find a set, C, of propositions describing the

situation just before the catastrophe.

This set will contain,

among others, propositions detailing the condition of the
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snow on the slope above the village.
call, was an avalanche).

(The catastrophe, re-

We will also have to find a set,

of law-like propositions such
that from them and the set
C of conditions we can deduce
that the catastrophe occurred.
L,

But it is unlikely that we can find
laws relating snow conditions to the occurrence of a catastrophe.
We would be more
likely to succeed if we tried to find
laws relating snow
conditions to the occurrence of an avalanche.
Thus, if we
want to explain the catastrophe, we should
first redescribe
it as an avalanche, and then find an
explanation for an

avalanche occurring.

in sum, if we want to explain the

catastrophe we must identify it with the occurrence of
an
avalanche, and this amounts to coarse-grained identification
of events.

Perhaps that is how explanation might be supposed to require coarse-grained event individuation.

reasoning is unconvincing.

But this line of

Apart from claiming that the

above account of explanation is inadequate (it is)

someone

who individuated events finely could nevertheless agree that
the catastrophe is identical to the occurrence of an avalanche

For example, Kim could consistently hold that the avalanche

occurring is the mountain having the property of having an
avalanche (at a time

t)

and that this event is the catastrophe

Of course Kim could not also consistently hold that the

catastrophe is identical to the mountain having the property
of there being a catastrophe at t, but there is no reason
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why he should want to.
Perhaps the claim about explanation can be modified to

yield an example of an identification which the fine-grained
theorist cannot accept.

Suppose we find sets C and L of

propositions which explain the avalanche occurring.

Pre-

sumably the proposition that the avalanche covering the

village occurred is not derivable from the union of C and
L,

for the laws included in L might be supposed to relate

snow conditions to avalanches, saying nothing about villages.
Now, Davidson might suggest, we can explain the avalanche

covering the village occurring only if we identify it with
the avalanche occurring, for we can explain the latter.

In

this case the defender of fine-grained event individuation

will surely deny that the avalanche occurring is the same
as the avalanche covering the village occurring.

Nevertheless, the defender of fine-grained event in-

dividuation need not despair.

He can agree that the proposi-

tion that the avalanche covering the village occurred is not

deducible from the union of C and L, and so the union of C
and L is not an explanans for the avalanche covering the

village occurring.

But he can also claim that there is some

other explanans for this event.

He can suggest adding to

the set C some propositions relating the location of the

snow-covered slopes to the location of the village and
adding to the set L some law-like proposition to the effect
that whenever a (sufficiently large) avalanche falls from a
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slope so related to a (sufficiently
small) village, the
avalanche covers the village. The new
explanans does explain the avalanche covering the village
occurring, and so
that event need not be identified with the
avalanche occurring
in order to explain it.
I am not sure that this is how
Davidson's remarks about explanation were intended
to bear
on the question of event individuation, but I
think that we
can agree that the argument we just outlined, albeit
sketchily,
does not support coarse-grained individuation, and

I

can think

of no other way in which an account of explanation
might re-

quire individuating events coarsely.

Davidson's remarks about causation are also difficult
to apply to event individuation.

Apparently the view of

causation he has in mind is one according to which if an

event
and

D'

causes

e_

causes an event e' then there are descriptions D

such that D picks out e,
D' n

D'

picks out e', and op

insantiates a true causal law.

Davidson then

says that "this talk of descriptions and redescriptions

makes sense... only on the assumption that there are bona
fide entities to be described and redescribed." We have al-

ready noted that fine-grained events can be described and

redescribed as well as coarse-grained events.

In fact,

these remarks do not even seem to support Davidson's claim
that events are particulars

.

For universals can be described

and redescribed, for example, by 'The Good' and 'Plato's

favorite Form*

I

am unable to see how Davidson's remarks
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about causation might be construed so as to
support coarsegrained event individuation.

Davidson's claim that the intelligibility of the

Identity Theory requires events also seems to
provide no
special reason for preferring coarse-grained events,
\

for

the Identity Theory can be intelligibly stated
in terms of

fine-grained events, as it has been by Kim

7

One disadvantage

.

of Kim's version of the Identity Theory is that for
it to be
true, that is, for mental events to be identical with
physical

events, mental properties

,

like being in pain, have to be

identical to physical properties, like having C-fiber stimulation.

Since it is unlikely that such properties are identical,

or even co-extensive, it is unlikely that Kim's version of
the Identity Theory is true.

But Davidson has in this con-

text made no claims about the truth of the theory, only its

intelligibility.

On the other hand, Davidson might be able

to argue that the truth of the Identity Theory requires

coarse-grained events.

Since, however, the truth of the

Identity Theory is disputed, this would not make a very

convincing argument.
Davidson clearly thinks that his account of the logical
form of action sentences provides a powerful and important

support for his theory of events.

Moreover, it is clear

that Davidson's account of action sentences

i_s

incompatible

with an extremely fine-grained approach to event individuation.

Consider
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(1)

Jones shot the victim with a gun.

Davidson's treatment of
(!')

(1)

(Ex) (Shot (Jones,

is as

the victim, x)

&

With

(a

gun, x)

)

that is, there is an event which is a shooting by Jones
of
the victim and that event is with a gun.

Any such event is

also, of course, a shooting by Jones of the victim.

So

Davidson's account of action sentences requires the identification of Jones' shooting the victim with Jones' shooting the

victim with

a gun.

But that is incompatible with Kim's view,

since according to him no single event is both

a

shooting by

Jones of the victim and also a shooting by Jones of the

victim with a gun, since Jones and the victim exemplifying
the relation expressed by 'x shoots £'

is distinct from Jones

and the victim exemplifying the relation expressed by 'x

shoots y with a gun'

Although Davidson's account of the logical form of
action sentences provides for the identification of some
events, it offers no general reason for preferring the ex-

tremely coarse-grained individuation favored by Davidson.
In particular, Davidson's translation of
(2)

Jones shot the victim

(3)

Jones pointed the gun and pulled the trigger

and

as
(2')

and

(Ex) (Shot (Jones

,

the victim,

x)
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<3,)

t

tligger?

neS

the 9Un

'

x?K°

'

-

Pulled Jone s, the

S

<

respectively, provides no logical reason
for identifying
Jones’ shooting the victim with
Jones' pointing the gun and
pulling the trigger. Yet this
identification is, as we have
seen, one that Davidson wishes to
make.
Finally, if the claims made in Chapter
III are correct,
Davidson's treatment of action sentences
can provide no

reason for individuating events coarsely,
since

I

there

argued that Davidson's account of action
sentences is inadequate.
Thus, I conclude that none of the considerations
we have examined provides any reason to
think that events are

coarse-grained rather than fine-grained.
3.

Davidson

'

s

Condition of Event Identity.

In "The

Individuation of Events" Davidson considers several conditions of event identity.

He suggests some necessary con-

ditions of event identity:

where x and

x=y then x and
Y_

y_

y_

are events,

occur at the same time? if

x=y_

f

then x and

occur at the same place; if x=£ than any substance in which

x is a change,

^

is a change,

is a change, x is a change.

and any substance in which y
He is tempted to regard the

first two of these as jointly sufficient conditions of event

identity, as well.

But he finally settles on the following

condition
(DI)

x=£ if and only if
and (z) (x caused z^

where x and

are events.

(

(z.)
y_

caused x
caused z)
(

)

,

-4

caused

y_)
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Davidson does not say how to interpret
the arrow.
i
suppose that the two conditionals on
the right-hand side
are material conditionals.
One consequence of this interpretation is that if (DI) is correct there
is at most one
event that is both uncaused and
inefficacious. This consequence is certainly unobjectionable to
someone who believes
that all events are caused.
Kim, however, has recently
argued 8 that not all events are caused.
Xanthippe's becoming
a widow, for example, was, according
to Kim, determined by
Socrates' dying, but Xanthippe's becoming a widow
was not
caused by Socrates' dying or by any other event.
If those
events which, according to Kim are uncaused do not
themselves cause any other events, then (DI) is clearly un-

acceptable for Kim.

Although Kim does not say, it seems

likely that his uncaused but determined events are themselves causes.

For, example, Xanthippe's becoming a widow

may have caused her becoming lonely, or it may have caused
her putting the house up for sale.

If so, then although

Kim thinks that there is more than one uncaused event, he

need not be understood as holding that there is more than
one event which is both uncaused and inefficacious.

Thus,

he might not find (DI) objectionable on that count.

We should expect Kim to find (DI) unacceptable on

other grounds, however.

For if (DI) really does individuate

events to Davidson's satisfaction, then it individuates them
coarsely.

But does (DI) individuate events coarsely?

We
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might first note that havi ng all and
only the same causes
and effects is surely a necessary
condition of event

identity— necessary because

it is a consequence of the

principle of the indiscernibility of
identicals.

So, of

course, identical events have the same
causal properties.

Goldman, however, has claimed that events
which
Davidson identifies differ both with respect
to their

causes and their effects

might be supported.

9

Let us examine how this charge

.

Consider first the claim that events

which Davidson identifies have different effects.

Accord-

ing to a story told by Miss Anscombe, a man
(intentionally)

operates a pump, replenishes the water supply of a
house,
and poisons its inhabitants

10
.

Now clearly on Davidson's

view and given the facts of the story, just one event has

been picked out.

The man's operating the pump is the same

as his replenishing the water supply, which is the same
as

his poisoning the inhabitants.

event here, and if

(DI)

But if there is just one

is correct,

then the man's operating

the pump has the same effects as the man's replenishing the

water supply and the man's poisoning the inhabitants.

We

may suppose that the man's operating the pump causes a

clicking of the valves of the pump.

But, according to the

objector, it seems false to say that the man's replenishing
the water supply or his poisoning the inhabitants causes
the clicking of the valves.

Davidson is not without a reply, however.

For he can
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deny that the man's replenishing
the water supply and his
poisoning the inhabitants do
not cause the clicking of the
valves.
After all, he can say, if events
are seriously
taken as coarse-grained,
concrete entities, then it is
clear that there is just one
event variously described as
an operating of the pump, a
replenishing of the water
supply, and a poisoning of the
inhabitants; and it is that
event which caused the clicking of
the valves.
Let us try another example.

Suppose that on some

particular occasion Jones sings loudly
and off-key.
Davidson would identify the events of

Then

Jones' singing, Jones

singing loudly, and Jones' singing off-key.

Let us suppose

that Jones' singing off-key causes his
voice teacher to
become angry. The objector will maintain,
however, that
Jones' singing loudly did not cause his voice
teacher to

become angry.

He might explain that Jones was supposed to

sing loudly, and he might cite the voice teacher's
remark,
I

didn't mind his singing loudly; it was his singing
off-

key that bothered me."
Again, Davidson can reply.

particulars

,

If events are concrete

and the event of Jones' singing just is the

event of Jones' singing loudly and the event of Jones'

singing off-key, then it is that event which caused the
teacher

s

becoming angry.

The relevant aspect of the event

of John's singing was that it was off-key.

Talk of

relevant aspects might be misleading, however.

It is not
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the aspect of being off-key, nor is it the
property of being

off-key, that caused the teacher's becoming angry,
according
to Davidson.

For Davidson takes causation to be a relation

between events, not between aspects (whatever they are)
or
properties and events.

Similarly, unless Jones' singing's

having the property of being off-key is an event, it is not
the cause of the teacher's becoming angry.

So what, then,

does it mean to say that being off-key is the relevant

aspect of Jones' singing relative to the teacher's becoming
angry?

think that one way in which Davidson might try to

I

answer this question is to note that Jones' singing off-key
is relevant to an explanation of the teacher's becoming

angry, in a way in which Jones' singing or his singing loudly
is not relevant.

At the end of his paper "Causal Relations" 1

there is a hint as to how Davidson might develop this sug-

gestion.

There he says that although the word 'cause' is

typically used to express a relation holding between events,
in sentences like 'The collapse was caused, not by the fact

that the bolt gave way, but by the fact that it gave way so

suddenly and unexpectedly', the word 'cause' expresses a

relation holding between statements

.

This latter relation,

he says, might be better expressed by the words

explain'.

'causally

Thus, according to Davidson, we are inclined to

treat
(4)

as true

,

The fact that the bolt gave way suddenly and
unexpectedly caused the collapse
and
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(

as

5

The fact that the bol t gave way caused
the collapse

)

false

,

in the case imagined, because

(4)

and

(5)

are to

be understood, respectively, as

The statement that the bolt gave way suddenly
and unexpectedly causally explains the collapse,

(4')

which is true, and
The statement that the bolt gave way causally
explains the collapse,

(5')

which is false.

It is difficult to understand Davidson's

claim that explanations relate statements and not events
since in (4')
a

and (5')

'causally explains' seems to relate

statement and an event.

Ignoring this point, let us see

whether we can construct a rebuttal to the objection of the
last paragraph.
f

We were considering, in effect, a case in which
Jones' singing off-key caused the teacher's becoming
angry

(6)

was true
(7)

,

and
Jones' singing loudly caused the teacher's becoming
angry

was alleged to be false.

If 'caused'

in

(6)

and

(7)

ex-

presses a relation between events and the truth values of
(6)

and

(7)

are as claimed, it follows that Jones' singing

off-key is distinct from Jones' singing loudly.
Davidson would say that someone who believes that
true and

(7)

Now perhaps
(6)

is false does so because in them 'caused'

presses a relation between a statement and an event.

is

ex-

But

what statement does 'caused' take in its first place in (6)?
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Surely, not 'Jones' singing off-key', for that is not a

statement.

Perhaps we are to supply one, although it is

not clear how to do so in general.
(6)

and

(7)

We might try rephrasing

as

(6')

The statement that Jones sang off-key causally
explains the teacher's becoming angry

(7')

The statement that Jones sang loudly causally
explains the teacher's becoming angry.

and

Maybe Davidson would say that when someone thinks that
true and

(7)

(6)

is false it is through understanding them as

is
(6')

and (7'), respectively.

But this does not appear to be right.

In the first place,

does not seem to be true.

(6')

The

statement that Jones sang off-key would surely play some
role in an explanation of what caused the teacher's becoming
angry, but it does not by itself explain the teacher's anger.

We need in addition to be told, among other things, that Jones
is a student of the teacher, that the teacher is a voice

teacher, and that the teacher had expected Jones to sing on
pitch.

Davidson would not be open to this criticism

if

by

'causally explains' he means 'would enter into a causal ex-

planation of', but then in the previous case
true, contrary to hypothesis.

(5')

would be

For the statement that the

bolt gave way would surely enter into a causal explanation
of the collapse, even though that statement does not by

itself explain the collapse.

mean (6') when we assert (6).

Moreover, we do not seem to
It is plausible, for example.
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to argue from (6)
i

f)

)

(Ee) (e

to its existential generalization

caused the teacher’s becoming angry)

where e is an event and 'caused' expresses

a

,

relation

holding only between events.
But Davidson need not insist that there is any
confusion
about

(6)

in making his rebuttal.

He can admit that (6),

understood in the sense in which it entails (6'') by
ex\

istential generalization, is true.
that

(7)

is true.

takenly thinks that

He should also claim

He might then add that the objector mis(7)

is false because he confuses it

with the admittedly false

(7')

This line of reasoning does

not seem to me to be very convincing, however, unless we

assume that Jones' singing off-key is identical to his singing loudly.

A more detailed account of the alleged ambiguity

would certainly improve Davidson's case.

Before drawing any

conclusion, let us briefly consider the claim that events

which Davidson identifies have different causes.
Consider again Jones' singing loudly and Jones' singing
off-key.

On Davidson's view of action it might be that

Jones' singing loudly was caused by his desire to please
.

his teacher,

1

but, according to the objector, Jones' singing

off-key was caused instead by his having a cold, which did
not cause his singing loudly.

Thus, it would appear that

Jones' singing loudly and his singing off-key have different

causes.

Again, Davidson could reply that one ought to keep

in mind that events are coarse-grained particulars.

Since
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Jones’ singing loudly just is Jones'
singing off-key, whatever caused the one caused the other.
Since the event is

complex (in some unspecified sense)
a

,

there must have been

number of factors which contributed to its
being th

it was.

way

Jones' cold, for example, contributed to his
sing-

ing's being off-key.

While

I

am sympathetic to the claim that events which

Davidson identifies differ with respect to their causes
and
effects, I do not think that the claim is convincing
enough
o

constitute a refutation of Davidson's theory.

For David-

son can consistently deny that events, like those cited
above, when conceived coarsely differ in their causes or

effects.

Nevertheless, the following weaker claim seems to

me to be correct.

Acceptance of Davidson's principle

(DI)

does not commit one to a coarse-grained view of events.

For

if one begins with a fine-grained theory of events, then

events like Jones' singing loudly and his singing off-key do
have different causes and effects.
In Section

2

of this chapter

I

tried to show that the

positive considerations which Davidson urged in support of
his theory of events do not in fact establish that events
are coarsely individuated.

In the present section

I

have

tried to show that Davidson's principle of event identity
does not require coarse-grained individuation, either.

I

turn now to more direct criticisms of Davidson's theory of

events
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An Objection Involving Time

4.

the two following

I

.

In this section and

shall consider three objections to

Davidson's theory of events.

The first objection is put

by Goldman as follows:

Suppose that John shoots George at noon but George
does not die of his wounds until midnight.
It is
true that John killed George and that he killed
him by shooting him; but is the killing the same
as the shooting?
Though it is clear that George's
death occurs twelve hours after John shoots him,
it seems false to say that George's death occurs
twelve hours after John kills him.
But if the death
follows the shooting, but not the killing by twelve
hours, the shooting and the killing must be distinct.

^

The difficulty is quite general, although often the time

difference is so small as to be unnoticeable

.

Thus, the

cartridge explodes slightly after Jones pulls the trigger.
i

Does the cartridge explode after Jones fires the gun?

If

not, Jones' pulling the trigger is distinct from his firing

the gun.

Jones pushes the plunger.

Later the dynamite ex-

plodes.

Does Jones' blasting occur before the dynamite ex-

plodes?

If not, Jones' blasting is distinct from his pushing

the plunger.
oven.

Jones puts a pan of cake batter in an automatic

Is Jones'

baking a cake over then?

If so, it is done

before the cake is.
Davidson accepts the consequence of identifying John's

shooting George with John's killing George.

1s

If George died

twelve hours later, then John killed him twelve hours
he died.

efore

Davidson suggests that we reconcile ourselves to

this conclusion.

Toward that end he distinguishes between

describing an event in terms of its terminal state, as

his
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painting the barn red', the referent of which is
not over
until he has finished painting the barn, and
describing an
event in terms of one of its effects.

Davidson thinks that

to describe an event as a killing is to describe
it as an

event which has a death as an effect, that is, a killing
is
an event which causes someone's death.

But is there any reason to think that when we call an

event a killing we merely mean that it is an event that caused
a

death?

For one thing, not all events which cause deaths

are killings.

In fact, not even all actions which cause a

death are killings, since someone can cause someone's death
by having them killed.

Moreover, negligent homicide seems

to afford examples of someone killing someone without doing

anything which causes the death.

If

I

stood idly by while a

train slowly approached the victim sleeping on the tracks,

I

might properly be said to have killed the victim, although no
action of mine caused his death.

My standing there did not

cause his death; rather, the train's running over him did.

Finally, it seems clear that 'John killed George' entails
'George is dead',

1

yet on Davidson's view the former could

be true while the latter is false, for a while, anyway.

Thus, it seems as though Davidson is mistaken in identifying

John's shooting George with John's killing George.
I

do not think, however, that Goldman's objection is

persuasive.

For consider the alternatives to holding that

John's killing George occurred at the same time as John's
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shooting George.
ternatives.

It seems to me that there are three
al-

One is to say that John's killing of
George

occurred at the same time as George's dying.

Another is

to say that the time of John’s killing
George was the entire

period commencing at the same time as John's
shooting George
began and ending at the same time as George's
dying ended 17
.

Finally

,

one could say that there is no time at which
(or

throughout which)

John's killing of George occurred, that

some events occur but not at any time.

None of these alternatives seems particularly attractive.
Perhaps the last one accords best with common sense.

If we

were asked when John killed George we might reply that it was
last year, or last September, or the first week of September.

But if we were pressed for more and more precise answers, we

would ultimately reject the question and instead explain that
John shot George at one time and that George did not die until

another time, twelve hours later.

This is some evidence that

we would ordinarily refrain from assigning a time to John's

killing George.

But the concept of an event like John's

killing George and the task of assigning times to such events
are both technical.

Our ordinary intuitions ought not be

supposed to tell us how to determine the time of John's
killing George any more than they ought be supposed to tell
us what an event is.

The most we can hope for is that our

ordinary intuitions motivate and illuminate our philosophical
claims.

It seems to me to be philosophically neater to think
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that for every event (which occurs)

there is a time at which

it occurs.

For this reason the third alternative
above ought
to be rejected.
if we reject it, then our philosophical

concept of an event begins to diverge from
our preanalytic
concept.
Moreover, it is not surprising that any attempt
to fix the time of John's killing George
will conflict with
our ordinary intuitions, given that we would
ordinarily refrain from assigning a time to it.

What

I

intend to do here

is to show that the only alternatives to
Davidson's treatment

of the time of a killing that seem to me to be at
all

reasonable also conflict with our intuitions.
to be drawn,

I

The conclusion

think, is that Davidson's attempt to fix the

time of John's killing George is no more suspect than any
other.

And thus, Goldman's criticism of Davidson in uncon-

vincing.

Consider the second alternative, that John's killing
George occurred throughout the entire period beginning with
John's shooting George and ending with George's dying.

This

suggestion has some plausibility in the analogous case of
Jones' baking a cake.

If Jones puts a pan of cake batter in

an oven, it is somewhat plausible to suppose that Jones'

baking a c$ke takes the entire time that the cake is in the
oven, and

r^ot

just the time that it takes Jones to puL the

pan in the oven and turn it on.

Even if we suppose that

the oven is self-timing, so that there is nothing Jones need

do to bake ,the cake beyond putting the batter in the oven
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and turning the oven on, it is tempting
to say that Jones'

baking the cake took the entire time that the
cake baked.
This bring the analogy closer to John's killing

of George.

If John's aim was good, there was nothing
he had to do ex-

cept shoot George to ensure that his killing of
George

would occur.

Thomson considers someone (called

'A')

who

melts some chocolate by flipping the switch of an electric
heater.
up,

19

She notes that if the heater took a while to heat

it would be true right after A flipped the switch to
say

that A had flipped the switch, but false to say that A had

melted the chocolate.

She takes this as evidence that at

that time A's flipping the switch had occurred and that A's

melting the chocolate had not occurred (that is, had at least
not finished occurring.)

There seems to me, however, to be an important objection
to taking as the time of John's killing George the entire span

including the times of his shooting George and George's dying.
Moreover, the same objection applies to the first alternative
above, that is, taking John's killing George to occur at

exactly the same time as George's dying.

It seems clear

that 'John's killing George is occurring' entails 'John is

killing George*.

Suppose then, that immediately after

shooting George, John turns the gun on himself and dies
instantly.

As before, we assume that George does not die

until twelve hours later.

If John's killing George occurs

throughout the entire interval beginning with the shooting
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and ending with the dying, or if John's killing of George

occurs at the same time as the dying, then there will be
times after John's death and before George's is over such

that at those times 'John's killing of George is occurring'
is true and ’John is killing George'

But that is

is false.

impossible, if the entailment noted above holds.

So the

first two alternatives are unpalatable as well.
I

do not pretend to have a solution to the problem of

what time John's killing of George occurred.

Given that

the alternatives to saying that John's killing of George

occurred at the same time as John's shooting of George are
so unattractive, it is unconvincing to attack Davidson for

identifying John's shooting of George with John's killing
of George on the grounds that these events occurred at

different times.

If a successful objection is one that is

not only true, but convincing as well, then this objection
to Davidson is unsuccessful.
5.

An Objection Involving Pla ce

.

Another objection to

Davidson's coarse-grained individuation of events is that
events which Davidson identifies seem to occur at different
places.

20

Before giving the objection in more detail, let

us look at how events are located.

ways easy to locate events.

It is certainly not al-

Vaguely, events seem to occur

where the objects that figure in them are.

Thus, if John

kisses Mary, the event of John's kissing Mary is located

where John and Mary are at the time of their kissing.
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Davidson shares this intuition and suggests the
following
principle:
"the location of [an] event at a moment

is the

location of the smallest part of the substance a
change in
which is identical with the event ." 21
This principle is extremely unclear.
cut my finger.

Suppose that

I

Then my cutting my finger is a change in me.

So the location of my cutting my finger is the location
of
the smallest part of me.

Suppose that the smallest part of

me is a particular atom in my pituitary gland.

Then ac-

cording to this principle, the location of my cutting my
finger is wherever that atom in my pituitary gland is.
this is absurd.

But

My cutting my finger occurred in at least

the space occupied by my finger.

Moreover, why suppose that

if an event is a change in a substance that there is a unique

substance a change in which is identical to the event?
that is what the principle requires.
in the kitchen.

Suppose

I

But

cut my finger

In which substance is this event a change?

Plausible candidates include my finger, my hand, me, and
the kitchen.

Davidson could perhaps avoid the first of these objections by revising the principle so that the location of
an event is the location of the smallest part of a substance
a change in

which part is identical to the event; and he

could avoid the second objection by allowing that the location of an event is determined by the location of any

substance a change in whose part is identical with the event.

q9

Perhaps, if whenever an event is a change in a part of more
than one substance, each such part overlaps all the others,

then the revised principle is acceptable.

For example, my

finger's being cut is a change in a part of my finger, and
it is a change in a part of my hand, but the smallest part
of my finger in which it is a change occupies exactly the

same space as the smallest part of my hand in which it is
a change,

and it is that space, according to the revised

principle, where my finger's being cut is located.
We might note that the principle gives the location of
an event

art

a

moment

.

If an event occurs throughout an

interval of time, it might be located in different places
at different instants.

Thus, if Boris strolls in Bologna
\

some evening, his strolling might be found on Via Rizzoli
at eight o'clock and on Via Zamboni at nine o'clock.
I

do not know if the revised principle is acceptable.

In particular, it is not obvious to me that an event cannot

be a change in disjoint smallest parts of distinct substances.
In fact, it seems likely that on Davidson's coarse-grained

view of events, it will often be the case that an event is
a change in parts of more than one thing where the parts

occupy different spaces.

But let us turn to the objection

to Davidson's method of event individuation.

Recall that

in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter

Davidson identified the event of my pointing the gun and

pulling the trigger with the event of my shooting the
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victim.

Now the space where the smallest part of
those
substances a change in whose parts is my pointing
the gun
and pulling the trigger is clearly at most
the space where
the gun and

I

are.

But the space where the smallest part

of any substance a change in which part is my
shooting the

victim is at least the space occupied by the victim
(or at
least that part of him that is struck by the bullet)

that

I

Given

am not the victim, the locations of the two events

are different, and so they are two events.

have stated

I

the objection in Davidson-like language, but
have.

.

need not

I

My pointing the gun and pulling the trigger occurs

in the space where the gun and

I

are.

My shooting the victim

occurs in the space where the victim and

I

are.

spaces are different, the events are different.

Since the

Similar

considerations show that my flipping the switch is distinct
from my illuminating the room, and both of these are distinct
from my alerting the prowler. Thus,

I

think that we can see

that several events which Davidson identifies occur at dif-

ferent places, and so they are in fact distinct.
6.

An Objection Involving the By-Relation

.

A final

objection to Davidson's coarse-grained approach to events is
due to Goldman,

22

who notes a certain

events which Davidson identifies.

asymmetry between

For it might be true,

let us suppose, that
(8)

John shot George by pointing the gun and pulling
the trigger,

10

(9)

but it is false that
John pointed the gun and pulled the trigger by
shooting George.
To see how this makes a problem for Davidson, let us
first

make the simplifying assumption that
(10)

What

(8)

John shot George exactly once and John pointed
the gun and pulled the trigger exactly once.
amounts to, according to a Davidson-like paraphrase,

is
(8')

(EX) (Ey) (x is a shooting of George by John) &
(y
is a pointing the gun and pulling the trigger by
(

John)

&

(By(x,y))).

If we assume, as Davidson does, that
(11)

John's shooting George is identical to John's
pointing the gun and pulling the trigger,

then we may conclude from (11) and
(12)

(x)
(x is a shooting of George by John if and only
if x is a pointing the gun and pulling the trigger
by John)

But now (12)
(9')

and (8') entail

(Ex) (Ey)

(

(x is

pointing the gun and pulling the
& (^ is a shooting of George by

a

trigger by John)
John)

However,
is false.
is

(11).

that

(10)

(9')

&

(By (x

,y_)

)

)

.

is the Davidson-like paraphrase of

So (9')

is false.

But if

9
(

'

(9), which

is false,

then so

Thus, Davidson's identification of John's shooting

George with John's pointing the gun and pulling the trigger
is mistaken.

One reply to this argument is to question whether (8')
is in fact a Davidsonian paraphrase of

(8).

There is good

10 2

evidence, however, to think that it is.

In "Causal Relation" 23

Davidson translates
(13)

Jack fell down, which caused it to be the case
that
Jack broke his crown
'

as
(13

)

There exists event e^ and e' such that e is a
falling down of Jack, e' ITs a breaking~of his
crown by Jack, and e caused e'.

Similarly, he treats
(14)

Jack fell down before Jack broke his crown

as
(14')

There exist events e and e' such that e is a
falling down of Jack, e“ is a breaking of his
crown by Jack, and e preceded e'.

It would only be natural to treat
as

(

8

'

)

similarly, that is,

(8)

.

Another possible reply is to question whether there is
such a thing as a by-relation.

After all, we know very little

about it except that it holds between events and is alleged
to be irreflexive and asymmetric.

Goldman suggests that it is.

Is it also transitive?

Thomson proposes the following

definition 24
(TB)

By(x,y_)

causes

{z) (x

z_

o

%_

causes

z)

One drawback of (TB) is that it allows that the by-relation
be reflexive.

Perhaps this is unobjectionable, but it can

be avoided by adding

ceptable?

I

'& x^y_“

am not sure.

to the definiens.

Is

(TB)

ac-

As Thomson herself notes, in

effect, it is not obvious that there are no pairs of distinct
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events satisfying

<z) (x

'

causes

z

o z causes

z)

which do not

'

also satisfy
(15)

(S) (S

does

S

does x by doing

yj

But any pair which satisfies 'By(x,£)'
must also satisfy 15 ).
Nevertheless even if (TB) does not define the
by-relation, we
do have a strong inclination to believe
that (8) is true and
(

,

(9)

is

false.

In lieu of any alternative explanation
of

these sentences, it seems reasonable to treat
them on the
model of (8') and (9'), that is, as involving
the by-relation,

however that relation may finally be analyzed.

We are justi-

fied in concluding, then, that not only is Davidson's
positive

support of his theory of events inadequate, but that his
theory is beset with serious difficulties.
7.

chapters

Appendix
25

I

"
:

Under a Description "

.

Twice in earlier

have postponed discussing Davidson's claims that

actions are intentional "under a description" and that
actions are explained only "under a description".
vs. Ephemeral Events"

In "Eternal

Davidson tries to explain his use of

the expression "intentional under a description".

He suggests

the following:
It was intentional of Oedipus that there was an event
that was his striking of the old man at the crossroads.
But though that event was identical with his striking
his father, it was not intentional of Oedipus that
there was an event identical with his striking his
father.
We may harmlessly compress the point by saying:
the striking of the old man was intentional
under one description but not under another. This
does not mean that the event did and did not have a
certain property, but that the event, Oedipus, and a

104

certain description, have a relation that does
not
obtain, between the same event, Oedipus, and
a dif
ferent description.

2

'

Davidson tries to motivate this manner of speaking
in two
ways.
He notes first that " [p]art of the point...

of speak

iny of

an action or event 'under a description*

is merely

to make explicit the fact that some context is
intensional.

For example, from
(16)

It was intentional of Oedipus that there was an
event that was his striking the old man

(17)

the old man = his father

and
>

we cannot infer
(18)

It was intentional of Oedipus that there was an
event that was his striking his father.

Substitutivity of identicals breaks down in

(16)

,

and it is

this fact to which Davidson wishes to call attention when he

says that Oedipus' striking the old man was intentional under
the description 'Oedipus'

striking the old man' but not under

the description 'Oedipus' striking his father*.

good.

So far, so

Substitutivity of identicals does break down in con-

texts like that of (16)

,

and it is no doubt worthwhile to

emphasize this fact.
But Davidson goes on:

The remainder of the point depends on the mixed nature
exof certain attributions of attitude or intent:
amples are knowing, acting intentionally, perceiving
that something is the case, remembering, and being
pleased that something is the case. At one time Oedipus
It follows that
was pleased to be married to Jocasta.
he was married to Jocasta; and since Jocasta was his
mother, that he was married to his mother. But he was
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not pleased that he was married to his mother.
'Oedipus was pleased that he was married to
Jocasata' thus expresses a relation between
Oedipus and Jocasta, but the truth of the
sentence depends on Jocasta' s being described
in one way rather than another.
It is natural,
therefore, to think of the sentence as expressing
a relation between Oedipus, Jocasta, and a certain
description of Jocasta.
In explaining why Oedipus
was pleased, we might want to make explicit reference
to the description of Jocasta under which he was
pleased to be married to her. 25*

A couple of things about this passage are puzzling.

Davidson says that (19)
Oedipus and Jocasta."

"thus expresses a relation between

This remark is puzzling, because in

the next sentence Davidson says that (19)
a

certain three-place relation holds.

(19)

First,

also asserts that

What relation does

assert to hold between Oedipus and Jocasta?

sibility is that it is the relation expressed by

pleased that he was married to y

'

One pos1

x was

We might be tempted, how-

ever, to think that this open sentence expresses no relation.

Given the truth of (19) and

Jocasta = his mother,

(21)

it does not follow that
(22)

Oedipus was pleased that he was married to his
mother.

But if permitting substitution of co-designative singular
terms is a necessary condition of a context's expressing a

property? then the above open sentence does not express a
property.
though;

It would be a mistake to draw this conclusion,

for *x was pleased that he was married to

ambiguous.

is

On one reading it creates an opaque context on

30
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its right.

On another reading it does not.

On this second

reading it expresses a relation de re between the pleased
and the one to whom the pleased is pleased to be married.

Normally understood,

includes an instantiation of the

(22)

opaque version of 'x was pleased that he was married to y

There is another interpretation of

(22)

'

.

that includes an

instantiation of the extensional version of the same open
sentence; however, this interpretation would normally be

expressed by something like the more perspicuous
(22*)

His mother is such that Oedipus was pleased to be
married to her
.

So perhaps when Davidson says that (19) expresses a relation

between Oedipus and Jocasta, the relation he has in mind is
the one expressed by the extensional version of 'x was pleased

that he was married to

y_'

.

On the other hand, maybe he in-

tends something fancier, like the relation expressed by 'x
r

was pleased that he was married to y_ under the description
r

if

While

I

have an idea of what the extension of

this predicate is,

I

have no idea as to what its intension

'Jocasta''.

is.

I

turn, however, to a matter of more immediate concern.

Davidson's main claim in the above passage is,
it, that

(19)

I

take

ought to be treated as predicating a three-

place relation of Oedipus, Jocasta, and the name 'Jocasta',
that is, as
(19*)

x was pleased that he was married to y_ under
(Oedipus, Jocasta, 'Jocasta').
description

Let us abbreviate 'x was pleased that he was married to £
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under description
that (19)
(

19 '')

•

as

'Dplease'.

Then Davidson's point is

can be represented as

Dplease (Oedipus

,

Jocasta,

'Jocasta').

Given the three-place predicate 'Dplease'
and the facts
of the case Davidson can note that
(19") in conjunction
with (21) entails
,

(23)

Dplease (Oedipus

,

his mother,

which is, therefore, also true.

'Jocasta'),

(it is read

'Oedipus was

pleased that he was married to his mother under
the description
'Jocasta'.)
(

32

')

Davidson can also interpret

Dplease (Oedipus

,

his mother,

(22)

as

'his mother').

Now (22') is false, but that is all right, since it
is not

entailed by (19") and (21).
If we accept this interpretation of

(19)

and (22)

then

presumably we will be willing to interpret
(16)

It was intentional of Oedipus that there was an
event that was his striking of the old man

in an analogous fashion as
(16')

It was intentional of x that there was an event
identical to y under description ot (Oedipus,
Oedipus' striking of the old man, 'Oedipus'
striking of the old man').

But without taking this additional step, let us ask whether

Davidson's treatment of

(19)

as

(19") is plausible.

First,

there is one respect in which Davidson's approach is misleading.

One might be tempted to think that the relevant

description of Jocasta under which Oedipus was pleased to
be married to her should be a description that Oedipus had
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in mind or might have used.

view.

But that is not Davidson's

Oedipus never had the descriptions 'Jocasta' or

'his mother'

in mind, although he may have had in mind

their Greek translations.

Deciding which descriptions are

relevant might be a problem for Davidson, but there is a
more serious difficulty with his account, to which

I

now

turn

There is, it seems to me

,

a decisive reason for re-

jecting (19'') as a paraphrase of (19).

It is, simply,

that since 'Dplease* yields extensional contexts,

(19'')

entails
(24)

whereas

There is a description 'Jocasta'
(19)

does not.

If there were no attractive alterna-

tive account, then Davidson might try to argue that we are
just ignorant of the linguistic facts entailed by

Here is one:

there are alternatives.
(25)

(Ex) (x =

married

Jocasta

&

(19)

.

But

Distinguish

Oedipus was pleased that he

x)

from
(26)

Oedipus was pleased that
married x)

Note that (25) but not
(27)

(Ex) (x =

married

Jocasta

in conjunction with

his mother

&

&

he

(21)

entails

Oedipus was pleased that he

x)

Even given (21) neither
(28)

(26)

(Ex) (x =

(25)

,

(26)

,

nor (27) entails

Oedipus was pleased that (Ex)
married x)

(x =

his mother

Note finally, that under appropriate assumptions (25),

&

he

(26),
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and (27) are true,

(28)

reading of (19), and

is false,

(27)

(26)

translates a common

translates a common reading of

(22)

There seems to be no reason why this account,
familiar
from treatments of the propositional attitudes
of knowledge
and belief cannot be extended to handle the intensional

contexts created by 'It is intentional that...'.

I

conclude

thau there are problems with talk of action "under a

description" and that Davidson has not dissolved these
problems
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CHAPTER

V

CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF EVENTS AS STATES OF AFFAIRS
In several recent papers 1 Roderick Chisholm has pre-

sented and defended a theory of states of affairs.

In

terms of this theory he has attempted to do at least three

things.

First, he has tried to give a theory of events and

propositions according to which these latter kinds of
entities are species of states of affairs.

Second, Chisholm

has also tried to give a relational theory of time according
to which talk of instants of time can be reduced to talk of

the occurrence or non-occurrence of states of affairs.

Finally, Chisholm has tried to show how talk of particular

occurrences of states of affairs can be interpreted in such
)

a way so as not to be committed to particular states of

affairs or concrete events, in addition to "generic" states
In this chapter

of affairs.

I

shall be concerned with the

first and the third of these enterprises.
three sections

I

In the first

shall briefly present Chisholm's theory.

In the four following sections

I

shall consider various

published criticisms of Chisholm's theory.

I

shall suggest

that although they require modification of some of Chisholm's
claims, they are not damaging.
I

shall present what

I

<

think are original criticisms of
Some of them are perhaps minor.

Chisholm's position.
Others of them show,

In the final three sections

I

believe, that Chisholm's theory
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stands in need of major revision.
1.

States of Affairs

,

Occurrence

,

and Recurrence

.

Chisholm says that a state of affairs is "anything capable
of serving as the object of belief, or of hope, of wonder-

ment, or of any of those other intentional attitudes that

take things other than attributes or individuals as their

objects."

2

Thus, a state of affairs is anything which can

be the object of a propositional attitude.

Furthermore,

states of affairs can be individuated by appeal to proposiFor any states of affairs p and q, p = q

tional attitudes.

if and only if it is necessary that for any person S and

propositional attitude A,
*
A
to q.

S

has A to

£

if and only if S has

3

All states of affairs exist

,

but only some of them occur

For example, there being unicorns exists, and there being

unicycles exists, for they both can be the object of a

propositional attitude.

Only the second, however, occurs.

Of special importance for Chisholm's theory is the fact

that states of affairs can recur, that is, they can occur

more than once.

Thus, there being a Republican President

occurred for eight years during the 1950's, and it is occurring again now.

In the interval between these two oc

currences of this state of affairs there occurred its
negation, that is, there not being a Republican President.

According to Chisholm, every state of affairs has

a negation,

and whenever a state of affairs p is not occurring,

j

.
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negation, not-£, is.

The notion of the negation of a state

of affairs can be used to elucidate the concept of recurrence.

Chisholm says, "an event recurs if and only if the event
occurs and then after that the negation of the event occurs
and then after that the event occurs."

4

For any two states of affairs £ and 2

conjunctive state of affairs, £

£

&

q.

&

2.*

there is the

./

The state of affairs

occurs if and only if £ occurs while 2 occurs.

Chisholm contrasts the occurrence of states of affairs
and their negations and conjunctions with the truth of
.

propositions and their negations and conjunctions.

5

.

First,

some truth involving negation.
(1)
(2)

(3)

£ is true or the negation of £

is true,

p is true if and only if the negation of the
negation, of £ is true
If the negation of

£

is true, then

£

is not true.

Of these, the first two, but not the third, remain true if

we replace the words 'is true' by 'occurs'.

The third be-

comes false because it is possible that a state of affairs

and its negation both occur.

For example, suppose that

there not being rain occurs at noon.

It would be a mistake

to conclude that there being rain does not occur, for it

might occur at two o'clock.^

The following are truths about

conjunctive propositions:
(4)

If p

(5)

£

&

&

2

is

true, then

£

is true and

q is true if and only if

&

£

2 ts true,

is true

3

,
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(6)

£

&

(SL

&

£.)

is true,

true if and only if q

If p is true and
is true.

(7)

If

(8)

(10)

£

£

&

(p

&

q is not true, then p

&

is true and q is true,

then £

&

If P

&

q is true, then

£

&

q
3

-

q is true,

If £ & q is true, and q & r is true, then
p
"
is true,

(9)

r)

&

r
~

is not true.

&

Of these, the first four, but not the last three, remain true
if we replace the words

'is true'

by 'occurs'.

The last

three turn out false because a conjunctive event occurs only
f

if its conjuncts overlap in time.

Chisholm gives the follow-

ing counter-examples to

Lincoln being President

(

8) —

(

10 )

has occurred and Agnew being Vice President has occurred,

but Lincoln being President and Agnew being Vice President
has not occurred.

Franklin Roosevelt being President and

Truman being Senator has occurred and Roosevelt being

President and Truman being Vice President has occurred, but
Truman being Senator and Truman being Vice President has not
Finally, Roosevelt being President and Truman

occurred.

being Vice President has occurred and so has Roosevelt being

President and Truman not being Vice President.
2.

locution

£ Occurs Before
1

£ occurs before

Begins

Chisholm introduces the

.

q begins

7

1

,

which he abbreviates

'pBq', and gives the following axioms governing its inter-

pretation.

®

Al £B<^ O

~qBq
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A2
A3

£ occurs and a occurs
[pBq and qBr and

A4 pBp D £B ~

A5

—'(p

)

=

(

EB a or gB E or E

a occurs)

f,

MqBp)]o pBr

£

(pB ~ p)

The relation expressed by Bq is
not asymmetrical.
£
Suppose
that pBq and that p recurs.
Then it might be that Bp.
So
a
'

9

it does not follow from pBq that

pressed by

’

pBq

~(pBq

)

The relation ex-

.

is not transitive, either.

'

Suppose that q

occurs, then r, which occurs only once, then
not-q, then p,
which occurs only once, and then r again.
In this case,

pBq is true, since
£ occurs before the second occurrence of
q, gBr is true,

since the first occurrence of

fore r begins, but pBr is false.

c[

occurs be-

Also, it follows from A2

that pBq entails that p occurs and
q occurs.
In terms of his primitive locution, Chisholm goes on

to give the following definitions
(Dl)

£ recurs

(u2)

£ always occurs

(D3)

£ occurs at least twice) = df £Bp,
=

jf

(

not-£ does not occur,

£ occurs exactly once

(B4)

=

df £ occurs and

~(£Bp)

occurs during £'s first occurrence
a q
q_

(D5)

(or

:

&

such that

<£

occurs exactly once,

£ does not occur, and ~(£BgJ

there is
&

s_

occurs,

,

There is something that occurs during what is at
least £“
that

s_

s

n

r

occurrence

there is an £ such

occurs exactly once, and there is a

an r such that:

£ occurs exactly once,

c[

j

and

occurs
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during
occurs
(D6)

g' s
,

occurrence n- 1

and p

&

g occurs exactly

,

gBr, rBs, p

&

s

r does not occur.

n times = df there is something

that occurs during what is at least

g' s n

th

oc-

currence and nothing that occurs during what is
at least g'

s

occurrence n+1.

These definitions define expressions purporting to denote

particular occurrences of

a state of affairs

g without using

any term that refers to particular occurrences of a state
of

affairs.

Thus,

by means of these definitions,, Chisholm

hopes to show how we can reduce talk of particular occurrences
of states of affairs to talk just about states of affairs.

Since, as we shall see in the next section, Chisholm regards

events as a certain subclass of states of affairs, he thinks

that these definitions provide a method of eliminating talk
of particular or concrete events in favor of his "generic"

events
3.

Events, Propositions

,

and Truth

.

Propositions, in

the sense of those entities "such that the laws of proposi-

tional logic may be interpreted as being applicable to them,"
may be defined according to Chisholm by the following

definition
(D7)

=
p is a proposition d f

g

is a state of affairs

it is necessary that either

g or not-g does not

occur.
It follows, according to

(D2)

Chisholm notes, that

a

&
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proposition is any state of affairs
which is necessarily such
that either it or its negation
always occurs. 10
And an event may be defined according
to the following
definition
(D8)

£ is an event
affairs

,

=

df

(n) £

(i)

£

is a contingent state of

no t a proposition, and (iii)
p

is

implies change.

A state of affairs implies change, according
to Chisholm, if
and only if it implies that there is some
state of affairs p
such that £ occurs and not— occurs.
p

Some states of affairs, then, are propositions,
some
are events, and some are neither.
xhus that state of affairs which is John walking
at
3 P.M., E.S.T., on February
5, 1970, will be a
proposition for it is necessarily such that either
it or its negation does not occur.
But that state
of affairs which is John walking will be an event;
for it is contingent, it is possibly such that both
it and its negation occur, and it implies change.
And that state of affairs which is John sitting will
be neither a proposition nor an event. 11
,

Finally, Chisholm proposes a theory of truth in terms
of the occurrence of states of affairs.

A proposition £ is

true if and only if £ occurs, and
£ is false if and only if

£ does not occur.

Moreover, if facts are states of affairs

that occur, then true propositions bear the relation of

identity to the facts they "correspond to".
4.

Existence and Occurrence

.

A possible objection to

Chisholm's view might be thought to lurk in the following

passage frQm a paper by Gertrude Ezorsky. 12
i
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Professor Chisholm does not argue that any alternative to this view is necessarily false, only that the
metaphysical view [that there are states of affairs]
ran clarify some issues in the analysis of language.
Since the metaphysical view is not necessarily true,
then its denial, "There are no states of affairs,"
must be significant.
But according to the metaphysical view, [there] is a state of affairs corresponding to every significant sentence.
In that case,
there must be a state of affairs corresponding to the
significant sentence, "There are no states of affairs,"
namely, the state of affairs, such that there are no
states of affairs.
But surely that state of affairs
is paradoxical 13
.

\

There are, of course, several lacunae in the above argument.
It does not follow from the fact that Chisholm did not argue

that alternatives to his view are necessarily false, that
his view is not necessarily true.
a

Nor need it be shown that

sentence is not necessarily false in order to show that it

is significant,

in the sense that it is meaningful.

But,

more to the point, what is paradoxical about the state of
affairs, there being no states of affairs?

that it occurs.

Well, suppose

Then it follows both that there are no

states of affairs and that there are states of affairs (since
This proves, of course, that it does not occur.

it is one).

But this is harmless enough, for Chisholm is not committed
to the occurrence of every state of affairs, only the ex-

istence.

And no contradiction follows from supposing that

the above state of affairs exists.
5.

The Problem of Adverbial Modification

An objection,

made repeatedly, by Davidson goes as follows:
I

An adequate theory [of events] must give an account
of adverbial modification; for example, the conditions under which [11] 'Sebastian strolled through
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the streets of Bologna at 2 A.M.
is said to be true
must make clear why it entails [12]
Sebastian strolled
through the streets of Bologna.' 14
'

Davidson's own theory treats
(11

)

(Ex)

(Strolled (Sebastian

Bologna
(12

)

(Ex)

,

x)

&

At

(2

A. M.

(Strolled (Sebastian

Bologna

,

and (12) as

(11)
,

x)

,

x)

,

x)

Through (the streets of

&

and

)

Through (the streets of

&

x)

The desired inference, on this account, goes through as
a

matter of logical form. But how can Chisholm explain this
inference? If he renders (11) and (12) as
(11*

')

(Ex)

(

is the strolling of Sebastian through the

streets of Bologna at
(12'

')

(Ex) (x is

2

A.M.

&

x occurred)

,

and

the strolling of Sebastian through the

streets of Bologna

&

x occurred)

then it is not obvious why the inference holds.
We might note that if the claims made in Chapter III are

correct, then Davidson's account of the logical form of action

sentences is defective, and thus he has not given a satisfactory

explanation of the above inference, either.

Moreover, there

is a reason, it seems to me, to think that particular events

are not needed to account for the entailment of

(12)

by (11)

.

For consider
(13)

The White House is white on Thursday, and

(14)

The White House is white.

Clearly,

(^.3)

entails

(14), but if we are to account for this

inference in an analogous fashion, we must suppose that there
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is a state of being white in which
the White House is and

in which it is on Thursday.

That is perhaps not so far-

fetched, but the extra entity required is not
an event.
The difficulty is that as we multiply examples
we seem to
have to multiply entities which by quantifying
over we ac-

count for certain inferences.

Thus Romane Clark 16 suggests

that
(15)

Jones was staggering drunk, from wine, in his room,
at 10

:

00

A.M.

entails
(16)

Jones was drunk at 10:00 A.M.

and that
(17)

Smith is an alumni trustee, of Duke, in Durham, for
an unexpired term of two years, starting in '66

entails
(18)

Smith is a trustee of Duke.

To account for the former inference in Davidson-like fashion,

we need to quantify over a state; to do the same for the
latter, we need to quantify over an office.

There is no

reason why we cannot introduce an appropriate entity to

quantify over in each case, but

a

more general treatment of

the type of inference in question would certainly be more

elegant
Such a more general treatment is suggested by Terence

Parsons

17

and Romane Clark

18
.

On their approach a predicate

modifier like 'from wine* is an operator which maps the
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property expressed by 'is drunk' onto a new
property (expressed by 'is drunk from wine'). Clark suggests
that for
standard modifiers (like 'in Bologna', 'at 2 A.M.',
'from

wine', but excluding what Chisholm 19 calls
"pseudo-adverbial

expressions" like 'apparently',
nearly

)

a

'in the imagination', and

principle of predicate detachment holds, and it

is this principle which licenses the above inferences.

Surely this theory needs to be worked out in greater detail.
But we have seen enough,

I

think, to see that the proper

response to Davidson's objection is to deny that an adequate
theory of events need account for inferences like the one
from (11) to (12).
6.

Two Schemata

.

In order to account for the mutual en-

tailraent of
(19)

There occurs that event which is the strolling of

Sebastian in Bologna at
(20)

2

A.M.

,

Sebastian strolls in Bologna at

and
2

A.M.

Chisholm introduces the following two schemata, where

'p'

may

be replaced by any well-formed sentence and 'not-p' by its

negation
(A)
(B)

(Ex)

[

(Ex)

[

not-p

(x

consists in the fact that

pj

&

(x

consists in the fact that

p)

&

(x
(x

occurs) ]=p,
occurs) ]=

.

These principles, Chisholm says, "could be said to reflect, in
part, our commitment to states of affairs."

ment
I

(19)

is an "informal rendering" of

Given that state-

(21)
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(Ex) (x

m
principle

(A)

consists in the fact that Sebastian
Bologna at 2 A.M. and x occurs)
accounts for the fact that

(19)

n

I.

rol ls

and (20) en

tail each other.

inciples

(A)

and

(B)

are puzzling, however.

As we saw

in Section 3, Chisholm defines a fact
as a state of affairs

which occurs.
that £

Thus, for any state of affairs p,

'the fact

is a proper description just in case
p occurs.

if

£ does not occur, not-£ occurs, it follows from

if

£ does not occur there

fact that

is

Since
that

(B)

something which consists in the

£ and which does not occur.

;But what can that be,

especially if there is no such thing as the fact that
£?
Perhaps Chisholm means to be using 'the fact that p' in this
context as a synonym for 'the state of affairs that p'.
again suppose that £ does not occur.

What is it that

But
says

(B)

exists, consists in the state of affairs that £, and does not

occur?

The simplest answer would be £, itself, although

I

do

not know if this is what Chisholm intends.

Chisholm gets more use out of his locution 'consists in
£'

in replying to an objection of Davidson's.

Davidson had

noted that if Sebastian strolled in the streets of Innsbruck,
then he took a stroll that was not in the streets of
Bologna.
(22)

21

Davidson then asked how Chisholm would analyse

Sebastian took a stroll that was not in the streets
of Bologna,

noting that
(23)

the strolling of Sebastian & x was not
in the streets of Bologna & x occurred)
(Ex) (x is
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would not suffice.

For if (23)

is an adequate rendering of

then

(22)

(24)

(Ex) (x is the strolling of Sebastian
the streets of Bologna & x occurred)

&

x was in

should translate
(25)

Sebastian took

a

stroll in the streets of Bologna.

But, given that there is only one state of affairs that is

the strolling of Sebastian,

and (24) contradict each

(23)

other, although the unanalyzed (22)

and (25) do not.

In response to this objection, Chisholm admits that
is not an adequate rendering of

(23)

(22)

and suggests in-

stead
(26)

consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
x occurred in a place wholly other than Bologna). 22

(Ex) (x
&

Now (26) is informative only if we understand what it is
to consist in a fact.

Are there many things that consist in

the fact that Sebastian strolled?

Or is there just one?

The following is a slight reason for believing that Chisholm

thinks that there is just one.

He was careful to put the

clause that Sebastian's strolling did not occur in Bologna in
a

positive way, that is, as in
(26')

(26)

and not as in

consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
x dFd not occur in the streets of Bologna)

(Ex) (x
&

This suggests that Chisholm wanted to allow for the pos-

sibility that
(27)

(25)

is also true and analyzed as

consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
x occurred in Bologna)

(Ex) (x
&

without contradiction.

But, of course,

(26')

and

(2
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contradict each other only if there is just
one thiny that
consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled.
A better
reason is provided by Chisholm's claim, noted
above, that

There occurs that event which is the strolling
of Sebastian in Bologna at 2 A.M.

(19)

is an "informal rendering" of
(Ex) (x

(21)

consists in the fact that Sebastian strolls
2 A.M. and x occurs)

in Bologna at

certainly

implies the uniqueness of the event in question.

(19)

If it is that event which is what consists in the fact
that

Sebastian strolls in Bologna at

2

A.M. and occurs, then

(21)

and also (26) should be taken as asserting uniqueness.

Davidson replies to Chisholm's acceptance of
the translation of

(22)

(26)

as

as follows:

This solution leaves us with two problems. First, we
do not know what the following well-formed sentence
means:
'There is an x such that x is the strolling
of Sebastian and x is not in the streets of Bologna'
(since Chisholm agrees that this doesn't mean that
Sebastian took a stroll that was not in Bologna)
And second, the solution works only on an ad hoc
basis, by finding some positive characteristic to
replace a negative. 23

Davidson's first problem can be easily answered,

I

think.

The sentence in question means that Sebastian never strolled
in Bologna.

think that

The second problem might be more serious.
,it

I

might be related to the following difficulty.

Suppose
(28)

Does

Sebastian took a stroll that was pleasant.
go over into

(28)
(29)

consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
x occurred and x was pleasant)

(Ex) (x
&

,
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If it does,
(30)

then

Sebastian took a stroll that was unpleasant

presumably gets treated as
(31)

(Ex) (x

consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
& x was unpleasant)

x occurred

&

On the assumption that there is just one thing that consists
in the fact that Sebastian strolled,

(29)

and (31) are con-

tradictory, although (28) and (30) can both be true if

Sebastian took at least two strolls.

Can (30) be analyzed

in a way that avoids this difficulty?

A feature common to both
1

(30)

.

(22)

and (25)

,

and (28)

and

.

is that there are truths about some occurrences of an

event that are not truths about other occurrences of that
event.

Since Chisholm does not want to speak of particular

occurrences of an event, he must engage in some circumlocution
to accommodate such cases as we have been considering.

Thus,

suppose that Sebastian strolled just twice and that his first

stroll was pleasant and his second unpleasant.

Since

(28)

reports Sebastian's first stroll, perhaps Chisholm could

treat it as
(32)

consists in the fact that Sebastian strolled
& (E^) (y_ consists in the fact that
Sebastian's stroll was pleasant & y_ occurs during
x s first occurrence)).
($x) (x

x occurred

&

'

(Recall that

fined by D4

,

'

s_

occurs during

above.)

jd's

Better yet,

first occurrence' is de(32)

could be simplified

and the expression 'consisting in the fact' dropped:
(33)

Sebastian's stroll being pleasant occurs during
Sebastian's strolling's first occurrence.
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Perhaps, in a similar manner, other claims about
particular

occurrences of an event can be stated.
We are still left with

(A)

further difficulty with them.

and

(B)

,

and there is a

Consider some state of af-

fairs that recurs, say, there being rain.

If this state of

affairs recurs, then there being rain occurs and there not

being rain occurs.
(34)

(Ex) (x

Thus,

consists in the fact that it is raining

&

x occurs)

and
(35)

(Ex) (x
&

By principle
(36)

and (34) we can infer

(A)

It is raining.

By principle
(37)

consists in the fact that it is not raining

x occurs)

and

(A)

(35)

we can infer

It is not raining.

Now (36) and (37) need not be contradictory; since the fair

weather and foul weather they report either occurred at different times or at different places, they do not affirm and

deny the same proposition.

However,

(37)

and principle

(B)

yield
(38)

(Ex) (x

consists in the fact that it is raining

&

x does not occur)

But the conjunction of (34) and (38) is inconsistent with
*

there being just one thing that consists in the fact that
I

suggested above that the expression

the fact that

jd)

'

'

(Ex) (x

p.

consists in

would be intelligible if for each sentence
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£

there was just one entity consisting in
the fact that
namely, the state of affairs that
if this suggestion
£.

is adopted,

then

(A)

and

(B)

being any recurrent events.

are incompatible with there

Since there being recurrent

events is an important feature of Chisholm's theory.
and

(B)

(A)

are inconsistent with Chisholm's theory.

On the other hand, there might be more than one thing

which consists in the fact that it is raining.
and (38)

are not inconsistent.

If so,

(34)

However, if this option is

taken, if in general for any sentence

there can be more

'g_'

than one entity which consists in the fact that
p, then

I

have no idea what it is for something to consist in the fact
that p.
(A)

and
(19)

I

(B)

think that Chisholm would be better off without
.

That would leave the mutual entailment of

There occurs that event which is the strolling
of Sebastian in Bologna at 2 A.M.
and
,

(20)

Sebastian strolls in Bologna at

unaccounted for, 25 but since

(19)

2

A.M.

is in the technical

language of Chisholm's theory, he can simply tell us what
it means, that it is, in fact, a fancy way of expressing (20).
7.

Another Objection

.

Chisholm considers

a

number of

objections to his theory, among them, the following:
"Your view requires us to say that that state of
affairs which is Nixon's being in Washington is not
the same state of affairs which is Johnson's successor being in Washington. But that event which
is Nixon's being in Washington is the same event
which is Johnson's successor being in Washington.
Therefore your view is not adequate to the concept of an event. "26
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Chisholm replies to this objection as follows:
But is_ Nixon's being in Washington the
same event as
Johnson s successor being in Washington.
Or. more
precisely, if n is there being one and only
one man
who is identical with Nixon and is in Washington,
and if J is there being one and only one
man who is
identical with Johnson's successor and is in
Washinqton, is N identical with J?
Surely not, for we can
say of N, but not of J, that had Humphrey
won, it
would not have occurred. 27
We might note that if John's sitting is not an
event (be-

cause it does not imply change), then Nixon's being
in

Washington is not an event either.

Rather, it should be a

state of affairs that is neither an event or a proposition.
I

shall claim below that this distinction has not been clear-

ly drawn,

and so we may safely ignore this point.

Aside from

this minor flaw, then, what Chisholm says seems to be right.

Davidson, however, does not agree.

He says,

If this were a good argument, we could unhinge other
true identity-statements:
compare 'We can say of
Nixon, but not of Johnson's successor, that had
Humphrey won, he would not have been president.
Therefore Nixon is not Johnson's successor. 28

Davidson seems to be suggesting that Chisholm's argument is
invalid

,

that there are instances of it with true premisses

and a false conclusion.

If this is Davidson's claim, he has

not put it convincingly, for, as Chisholm notes, the premisses

Davidson offers are not both true.

Davidson's argument may

be written like this
(39)

Nixon is such that he would not have been president
had Humphrey won.

(40)

Johnson's successor is such that he would have been
president had Humphrey won.
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(41)

Nixon ^ Johnson's successor.

This is indeed an argument with a false conclusion,
and it
does have the same form as Chisholm's argument.

But it does

not show Chisholm's argument to be invalid, since
the second

premiss is false.

We might put Chisholm's argument like this

(42)

N is such that it would not have occurred had
Humphrey won.

(43)

J is such that it would have occurred had Humphrey
won.

/. (44)

N f J.

We may assume that we are given (42).
If the expression

'J'

then presumably it is.

Is

(43)

also true?

abbreviates denotes a state of affairs,
If, however,

the expression

'J'

ab-

breviates denotes a particular event of the sort favored by
Davidson, then perhaps it is not. 30

At any rate, it is not

clear that Chisholm has committed a fallacy.

And while his

argument may not be sufficient to convince someone who does
not accept states of affairs, it is at least a consistent
reply to the objection against which it was intended.

And

so that objection, anyway, is not damaging.
8.
I

Chisholm'

s

Definition of

'

Event

.

I

turn now to what

think are more important difficulties with Chisholm's

theory of events.

The first has to do with certain puzzles

about his definition of 'event*.

Recall that the definition

is
(D8)

(i) £ is a contingent state of
is an event
affairs, (ii) £ is not a proposition, and (iii) £
implies change.

£
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wonder first whether anything is added to the
definition by
requiring that events be contingent.
Suppose that '£' is
I

restricted to states of affairs.
thing not contained in clause

(

Does clause

ii ) ?

add any-

(i)

suspect that it does

I

not.

Suppose that some state of affairs
£ is not contingent.
Then either it is necessary that
always occurs or it is

£

necessary that £ never occurs.
it is necessary that

Consider the first case.

£ always occurs, then by

necessary that not-£ does not occur.

(D2)

,

If

it is

But if it is necessary

that not-£ does not occur, then
£ is such that necessarily

either it or its negation does not occur.
to say, in virtue of (D7)

,

But that is just

that £ is a proposition.

Consider

the second case, that it is necessary that p never occurs.

Then £ is such that necessarily either it or its negation
does not occur.

proposition.

But again, by (D7)

Conversely, if £ is not a proposi-

tion, then it is contingent.
(i)

First,

(D2)

I

.

it follows that p is a

Thus, if a state of affairs £ is not contingent,

then it is a proposition.

clause

,

I

So clause

(ii)

or (D8) entails

have two reservations about this argument.

was used, and it might not be adequate.

Second,

have had to supply a definition of a state of affairs being

contingent

,

definition.

and Chisholm may have intended some other

We are surely justified in asking, however,

what Chisholm intends to add to
Secondly,

I

(D8)

by including clause

(i)

wonder whether clause (iii) adds anything

to the definition of 'event', or more exactly,

I

wonder what
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clause (iii) amount to.

Chisholm says that

p implies change just in case

state of affairs

|d

state of affairs

a

implies that there is some

such that ^ occurs and not-<q occurs.

But

what is this relation of implication holding between states
of affairs?

Well, one possibility is that it is the relation

of material implication, about which there are many truths of
logic.

But as we have seen, Chisholm interprets the laws of

logic as being about propositions, and not events.

Thus,

material implication has not been defined for events, or for
states of affairs generally.
(D9)

(materially)

p

where p and

We might try

implies

If

c[

|d

occurs then

<£

occurs,

are states of affairs and the conditional on the

c[

right-hand side is understood as a material conditional.

But

given that there are events that recur, for example, there

being rain, it follows trivially that every state of affairs
p is such that if

jd

occurs then there is a ^ such that
So if

curs and not-c^ occurs.

(D9)

oc-

is taken as defining the

sense of implication Chisholm has in mind, no state of affairs fails to imply change.
of affairs like John's sitting
in his garage

32

But Chisholm insists that states
31

or Jones' automobile being
.

So

are neither events nor propositions.

perhaps the following definition is more appropriate:
(DIO)

p implies

then

where £ and

c[

c[

=

occurs

df

It is necessary that if

are states of affairs.

jd

occurs

According to (DIO)

John's sitting implies change only if in every possible world
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in which John's sitting occurs
there is some state of affairs

a such that a occurs and not- a occurs.

is it true that in

every possible world in which John's
sitting occurs there
is a a such that
a occurs and not- a occurs? I suspect that
it is, although I am not sure how
to answer the question.
One somehow feels that John could not
exist if he did not at
least do a little thinking, and if he did, there
would be
some state of affairs such that both it and
its negation occur
Regardless of how we answer the question, I think it
is clear

that Chisholm is committed to an affirmative answer.

Consider

the following passage:
I shall make three metaphysical assumptions:
(1)
that no event is followed by its negation unless
some individual thing alters or comes into being
or ceases to be; (2) that every individual thing
is such that, for any two moments of its existence,
it has some properties at the one moment it does
not have at the other; and (3) that nothing is
capable of "two beginnings of existence" i.e., if
a thing ceases to be then it itself does not come
into being again.
These assumptions guarantee that,
as long as there are individual things
for any
interval of time something is occurring throughout
that interval that does not occur at any other
interval. 33
,

I

.

.

.

think that by calling these assumptions "metaphysical",

Chisholm means to suggest that they are necessarily true.
Moreover, he adds in a footnote that "given a proper con-

ception of time, the statement expressing the second of
these assumptions can be shown to be analytic.

Thus,

I

think that Chisholm is committed to holding that in every

possible world every individual thing is such that, for any
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two moments of its existence, it
has some properties at the
one moment it does not have at
the other 35 So consider
those worlds in which John's sitting
occurs and pick any
two moments at which John exists in
any such world.
At
the one moment John has a property
which he lacks at the
.

other.

Pick any such property and call if

'F'

.

Then John's

being F occurs at the one moment and John's
not being F
occurs at the other. Thus, in any world in
which John's
sitting occurs, there is some state of affairs

g such that

both g and not-j occur.
implies change.

But then, by (DIO)

John's sitting

,

So John's sitting is an event, after all.

This argument shows that any state of affairs which
implies
(in the sense of

implies

(DIO))

(in the sense of

that there is some individual thing,
(DIO)

)

that there is change.

And

so any such state of affairs will be an event, if it is not
a

proposition.
Are there any states of affairs that are neither events

nor propositions?

On the assumption that (DIO) gives the

sense of 'implies' which Chisholm intended,

I

have not been

able to think of any state of affairs which is neither an

event nor a proposition.
there are none.
ject (DIO

)

Of course, it does not follow that

On the other hand, maybe Chisholm would re-

.

A final suggestion comes from Chisholm, himself.

In a

footnote he says that "we may define a sense of entailment
that is stronger than logical implication:

'jd

entails g
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provided only it is necessary that

(i)

E implies a and

(ii)

anyone who accepts
E also accepts a -» 36 Let us call the
relation Chisholm here defines 'C-implication'.
Then we can
state the following definition:
.

Is

(Dll)

£ implies

(Dll)

of any help in making sense of (D8)?

According to

(D8)

,

£ C-implies
I

think not.

if a state of affairs, say, John's walk-

ing, is an event, then John's walking implies
that there is

some state of affairs q such that
q occurs and not-q occurs.

And according to (Dll), this latter holds only if it
is

necessary that anyone who accepts John's walking accepts
there being some

q^

such that

q^

occurs and not-q occurs.

of course, this is not necessary.

But,

Suppose that someone who

does not think that states of affairs have negations accept

John's walking.

Then that person, if consistent, will not

also accept there being some state of affairs q such that
q

occurs and not-q occurs.

But then if (Dll) is right, John's

walking does not imply change, and so it is not an event.
Chisholm, of course, would think that John's walking is an
event, so (Dll) must not capture his intention in clause
(iii)

of

(D8)

.

The difficulty with (D9) and (DIO) was that

they allowed more states of affairs to be events than

Chisholm wants.

The difficulty with (Dll) is that it does

not allow as many as Chisholm wants.
We might wonder why Chisholm would want to make the

distinction between events and states of affairs which are
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neither events nor propositions.

If there is no compelling

need to make the distinction, then it is
no loss if it has
not been made clearly.
Since Chisholm has not told us why
he wants to make the distinction, we
can only speculate as
to how serious the objection that
9.

Counting.

I

have been making is.

Chisholm's theory, like any fine-grained

theory of events, immediately faces some difficulties
due
simply to the plethora of entities it posits.

One such

difficulty is to make sense of our ordinary concept of an
event in terms of the myriad of events presupposed by the
theory.

For example, suppose that Sir Walter Scott was

knighted at night with honor.

We might ordinarily say, in

this case, that one knighting occurred.

But on Chisholm's

theory, when Scott was knighted, at least the following

events occurred:

Sir Walter Scott's being knighted; Sir

Walter Scott's being knighted at night; Sir Walter Scott's
being knighted with honor; Sir Walter Scott's being knighted
at night with honor; the author of Waverley
etc.

'

s

being knighted:

Clearly these are all distinct, on Chisholm's view,

since for any pair of these states of affairs someone could

believe one and not believe the other, or expect the one
and not expect the other, or hope for the one and not hope
for the other, and so on for the other attitudes.
It is instructive to see that two maneuvers open to Kim

are not available to Chisholm.

Consider first the two

events, Scott's being knighted and Scott's being knighted at
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night.

Assuming they both occurred 37 and that
no one else
was knighted then, just one knighting
occurred.
According
to Kim the first of these is Scott's
having the property of
b eing knighted (at a time t)
and the second is Scott's
having the property of being knighted at
night (at t)
Kim
can go on to say that since only the
constitutive property
_

,

.

of the former is being knighted

only the former is a

,

knighting; to count knightings you count instances
of the

property being knighted.

O O

This move is not open to Chisholm,

however, since his theory has no room for constitutive

properties
Or consider Scott's being knighted and the author of

Waverley

'

s

being knighted.

According to Kim, these two

descriptions each describe the same individual having the
same property and so, assuming they occurred at the same
time, describe just one event.

On the other hand, Chisholm

is committed to holding that Scott's being knighted is dis-

tinct from the author of Waverley

1

s

being knighted, since

someone ignorant of the identity of Scott and the author of

Waverley could believe the one and not believe the other.
The events of our intuitions are, if not coarse-grained,
at least medium-grained, and Chisholm has not shown how they

might be reconstructed out of his fine-grained ones.
there any obvious way of doing so.

Nor is

But until this is done,

Chisholm's theory would seem to be unable to make clear sense
of our preanalytic intuitions about events.
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10.

Same^ Time,

Different Place

Chisholm's theory is

.

designed to accommodate states of
affairs which occur at some
time and whose negations occur
at other times.
But his
theory also allows the possibility
that an event might occur
a certain place while its
negation occurs in another

m

place at the same time.

But this possibility makes trouble

for some of Chisholm's definitions.

Consider first Chisholm'

definition of recurrence:
(Dl)

p recurs

Informally
recurs

,

(or

£ occurs at least twice)

==

dBp
df — C-

Chisholm explains recurrence as "if an event
p
that is, if p occurs at least twice, then
occurs,
,

£

p is followed by its negation, and

39
£ follows its negation."

But this formal definition does not require that an
event

occur followed by its negation and then occur again.

It

merely requires that for an event to recur, some occurrence
of it must occur before another occurrence.

Suppose that it

only rains twice, and that both occurrences of there being
rain occur on the same day.

Suppose, furthermore, that on

that day it rains in Chicago from 8:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M.

,

and it rains in Grand Rapids from 8:30 A.M. to 9:30 A.M.
It seems clear that there being rain has occurred twice.
It also seems to be the case that there being rain has oc-

curred before there being rain begins.

But it is not the

case that there being rain occurs, followed by there not

being rain, followed by there being rain.

So Chisholm's

formal definition of recurrence does not capture his informal
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explanation.
A reply to this objection
might be as follows:
(A4)

Axiom

pBjDogB — £

requires, it might be claimed,
that

'

Eb E

'

should be under-

stood as saying that an occurrence
of E finishes o ccurring
before an occurrence of
p begins to occur, rather than as
saying that an occurrence of
E begins before another occurrence of E begins. Again suppose
that it only rains
twice, but this time suppose that
it begins to rain at 8:00
A.M.

in Chicago and continues forever,
and it begins to rain
at 8:30 A.M. in Grand Rapids and
continues forever.
In this

case it is inconsistent with (A4)

to assert that there being

rain occurs before there being rain, for
there is no oc-

currence of there not being rain which begins
after either
of the occurrences of there being rain.
In the case as originally described, that is,
when it

rained only from 8:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. in Chicago
and from
8.30 A.M. to 9:30 A.M. in Grand Rapids, there is an
oc-

currence of there not being rain which begins after an occurrence of there being rain.

violate

(A4)

.

What

I

think that this points out, however,

is that Chisholm's axioms

relation.

So this case does not

(A1)-(A5)

do not specify a unique

On the one hand they seem to be consistent with

k e i n 9 interpreted as

'there is an occurrence of p

which finishes before some occurrence of

c[

other hand, they seem to be consistent with

begins'
'

.

On the

EBc[' being
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interpreted as 'there is an
occurrence of p that begins
before some occurrence of
a begins, unless p-g. and there
is no occurrence of not-p
beginning after an occurrence

of p, in which case there is
an occurrence of
p that
finishes before an occurrence of
begins'.

g

The original objection could
have been stated in a
way which avoids the controversy
over the interpretation
of
pBq
Again suppose that it never rains
except that
theie is a time
such that it begins to rain
,
.

at

in

Chicago, and there is a later time t
such that it rains
2
Chicago at every time after
up to, but not including,
Also, it begins to rain in Grand Rapids
-2*
at t
Clearly
it is the case that there is an
occurrence of there being

m

.

ram

which finishes occurring before another occurrence
of
there being rain begins, thus satisfying the
definiens
of

(Dl)

.

But again, it is not the case that the event of

there being rain is such that "the event occurs and
then

after that the negation of the event occurs and then
after
that the event occurs."

^

So Chisholm's informal explanation

of recurrence does not match his formal definition.

A way of avoiding this difficulty would be to revise
(Dl)

as follows:
(Dl')

p recurs in

L =

occurring in
where

'L'

_

(p's occurring in L)B(p's

L)

is to be replaced by the name of a place.

would leave 'p recurs

(

simpliciter

)

'

undefined.

This

However,
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part of the point of talking
about recurrence is to make
sense of sentences like,
'Something happened last week in
Los Angeles, and the same thing
happened this week in New
York
and (D1‘) is of no help for that.
1

,

Another, and perhaps more serious,
difficulty due to
the fact that an event may occur
at one place while its
negation occurs at another, is with
(D4)

(D4)

occurs during £'s first occurrence =
there
3. such that q occurs exactly once,
q & s
occurs, q &^p does not occur, and ^(pBq).
s^

18 a

Suppose that it never rains in Tempe

being rain always occurs in Tempe.

,

Arizona.

So there not

Suppose also that the

first occurrence of there being rain is in
Seattle.

It is

likely that there were a number of things which
occurred

during the first occurrence of there being rain.
the inhabitants were greatly amazed.

getting wet occurred then.

Perhaps

Certainly the ground's

If so, there must be some state

of affairs q satisfying the conditions set by the definiens
of

(D4)

.

But one of these conditions is that
q

being rain does not occur.
always occurs
2.

occurs and q

(in Tempe,
&

&

there not

But, since there not being rain

at least)

,

there is no q such that

there not being rain fails to occur.

So

nothing occurs during the first occurrence of there being
rain.

In particular, there being rain does not occur during

the first occurrence of there being rain.
is defective.

in

(D5)

,

Since

(D4)

So obviously,

(D4)

is the base case for the induction

and since (D6) relies on (D4) and (D5)

,

(D5)

and
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(D6)

are defective, as well.

Thus Chisholm has not defined

’£ occurs exactly n times-, and thus
it is not clear that

his generic events can do the work
of particular events.

Chisholm could avoid this objection by
adopting a suggestion he makes in another context. 41
Conjunctive states
of affairs could be restricted in
the following
way.

Where
42
and
P
a are any states of affairs,
the conjuctive state
of affairs ft
j occurs if and only if E occurs while a occurs, and £ occurs where
j occurs. In the case above, if it

rains in Seattle, then any event
£ occurring only during the
raining and occurring only in Seattle is such
that a & there
not being rain does not occur. The fact that there
not being
rain occurs in Tempe is irrelevant, because that
is not where
q occurs.

And so the above counter-example no longer applies.

The trouble is that the notion of the location of an
event
is unclear.

While some events, like Socrates' drinking hem-

lock, are easily locatable
not.

(where Socrates was), others are

Where does there being no unicorns occur?

does my not being at home occur?

not know.

Here?

Or where

At my home?

I

do

There not being rain can occur, presumably,

wherever it is not raining.
rain in Tempe occur?

But where does there not being

Just in Tempe?

Or everywhere?

I

would be tempted to think that such "place-indexed" events
occur everywhere if they occur anywhere.

countenance the following anomaly.

But then we must

If Jones and Smith

never sleep in the same place, then it might be that the
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conjunctive event Jones' sleeping in Chicago
and Smith's
sleeping in St. Louis occurs, if they sleep,
respectively,
Chicago and St. Louis. But the conjuctive
event Jones'
sleeping and Smith's sleeping will not occur.
Another difficulty is that even if we were able to decide
where events

m

occur, how close together must
£ and ^ occur for £ to occur
where q occurs? Since my body occupies a different
space

than your body

,

does it follow that the event my talking

and your talking never occurs, even if we hold a lengthy

conversation.

These considerations do not show that it would be im-

possible to state Chisholm's theory in a way that is both
clear and immune to objections.
of the last three sections,

that has not yet been done.

But based on the remarks

think that we can agree that

I
I

think, furthermore, that a

full evaluation of Chisholm's theory cannot be attempted

until we see how successfully it can cope with these

difficulties
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CHAPTER

VI

Conclusion
In this chapter

I

shall first review some motivations

for thinking that there are such things as
events, and

I

shall be interested in determining how compelling
each of
these motivations is, and how well the three theories
we

have examined accommodate themselves to these motivations.

Secondly,

I

shall list some difficulties to which any

adequate theory of events ought to provide solutions, and
I

shall try to measure how well the theories of Kim,

Davidson, and Chisholm cope with these difficulties.
1*

Motivation

.

There are a cluster of reasons in

favor of an ontology of events which might be called

"linguistic" reasons, for they all appeal to some feature
of our language.

First, we often assert true sentences,

such as
(1)

John's kicking the door startled me.

A natural way of understanding this sentence is as assert-

ing that there occurred a certain event

kicking the door'

-

which startled me.

1

-

denoted by 'John's
While the three

philosophers we have considered do not make this claim
explicitly, it is clear that they agree with it.

Of course

there are other expressions in our language which purport
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to refer to events.

Definite descriptions like,

performance of Beethoven's Ninth
ample.

'

,

provide

a

'the first

notable ex-

Davidson adds the following caveat, however: "If

the only pressure for adopting an ontology of events
comes

from such phrases as

'Sally's third birthday party', we

would probably do better to try and [sic] paraphrase these
away in context than meddle with the logical form of sen-

tences like 'Brutus killed Caesar' or 'Bread nourishes' so
as to show singular terms referring to events or variables

ranging over them.

2
"

Davidson offers other linguistic

reasons for the existence of events.

One, as we have

already seen, is that he thinks that there must be events
to account for the inference of
(2)

Boris strolled

(3)

Boris strolled in Bologna.

from

I

argued in Chapter III that Davidson's treatment of the

logical form of action sentences

-

account of the entail ment of

by

(2)

which does provide on
(3)

-

is defective,

because it cannot handle cases in which two things are
done at once.

I

also suggested in Section

IV that a more general account of

would be more promising.
I

5

of Chapter

adverbial modification

Because of these considerations

do not think that this is a good reason for accepting

events
There is a further linguistic reason, also due to

Davidson, that is worth mentioning.

Davidson considers
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some parallels between
(4)

The explorer was in the cellar

(5)

The explosion was in the cellar,

and

and then remarks

With respect to relevant grammatical and logical
matters, the parallel between talk of explorers
and talk of explosions is just about complete.
As
we have seen, explorers and explosions alike invite
the definite and indefinite article; they also
invite plural forms, universal quantification,
counting and identity statements. There is no
more reason to think that we can give a satisfactory
account of the truth conditions of sentences about
explosions without invoking particular, dated events,
than there is to think that we can give a satisfactory
account of the truth conditions of sentences about
explorers without invoking particular, mortal bodies.
We might note that this consideration is not a compelling

reason to accept events.

Nouns like 'gap* and 'hole' meet

the conditions Davidson lists, yet we would not want to

suppose that we must be committed to particular gaps and

particular holes in order to give an account of the truth
conditions of sentences like,
front teeth'.

'There was a gap between her

Nevertheless, Davidson's remarks indicate

at least a prima facie reason for thinking that there are

events.

Coupled with other considerations it may well

be persuasive.

Another kind of reason which various philosophers
have given in favor of events is that they are needed for
the theory of explanation.

Kim says that he is ''interested

in events qua objects of explanation." 4

Sections

1

and

2

As we noted in

of Chapter IV, Davidson also holds that
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"explanation... seems to call for events." 5

And, although

do not know whether Chisholm has said
so in print, he
also believes that events are needed for
explanation. 6
I

There is an interesting conflict, however,
between what
Kim and Davidson have said about needing events
for

explanation and what they have said about events. 7
In "Events and their Descriptions: Some
Considerations"

Kim considers various ways of defining a deductive
ex-

planans for a statement E, and he is concerned to make

precise the way event-describing statements are related
to
events

.

By combining these two enterprises he hopes to

make intelligible the notion of an explanans for an event.
In this connection he accepts

"the unexceptionable principle

that if event e is identical with event e
for e is an explanans for e'..." 8

'

,

any explanans

However, when Kim gets

around to spelling out some details of his theory of
events, 9 he says some things incompatible with this

principle.

As we saw in Section

2

of Chapter I, according

to Kim's theory there is just one event described by
(6)

Wilbur married Edith

(7)

Edith married Wilbur,

and

yet Kim thinks that what explains

(6)

might not explain

10
(7)

Kim is aware of the conflict between what he said in one
paper about explanation and what he said in another paper
about identity conditions for events.

He now holds both
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that

(6)

explains
[

t

]

and
(6)

describe the same event and that what

might not explain (7).

his means that

connection

m

(7)

I

I

He also says that

have to loosen up the fairly tight

presuppose between events and explanations

the Hempel volume paper." 11

This last concession is

interesting because it means that the relation
between
explanation and events is left unexplained.
tion is only of statements

,

If explana-

then there is no need to posit

events to account for explanation.

If,

on the other hand,

someone says that events are needed for explanation,
but
does not show how they are connected, then it is
difficult
to assess the claim.

Davidson seems to be in even worse trouble in this
connection.

For he says that events are needed to give an

account of explanation, but then also says that "[ex-

planations typically relate statements, not events." 12

Elsewhere he says that "explanation, like giving reasons,
is geared to sentences or propositions rather than directly

to what sentences are about:

thus an explanation of why

Scott died is not necessarily an explanation of why the
author of Waverley died." 11

But if explanation is

"geared to sentences or propositions", then explanation

provides no motivation for accepting events beyond the fact
that some of the sentences with which explanation is con-

cerned are true and involve commitment to events.

But

then explanation provides no special motivation for ac-
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cepting events
Since

I

am unfamiliar with Chisholm's views on ex-

planation,

I

do not know if he is faced with similar dif-

ficulties.

However, since events for him are proposition-

like, it is likely that he is not subject to the same sort

of criticism.

Another kind of motivation for events is that there
must be events in order to give an account of causation.

Kim says, as we saw in Chapter

I,

that events are the

relata of the relation of causation.

1

A

And in "Causal

Relations" Davidson tries hard to show that causation is a
relation holding between events.
I

that some events cause others.

Chisholm, too, believes

C

One might wonder whether

the same sort of objection that was made against Kim and

Davidson's appeal to explanation as a motivation for ac-

cepting events can be made against their appeal to causation.

After all, we saw in Section

3

of Chapter IV that

Davidson thinks that ’caused* sometimes functions as an

sentential connective or as an operator on statements
perhaps better expressed by the words 'causally explains'. 16
If causation turns out to be a relation between statements,

then it would seem to provide little support for thinking
that there are events.

But, of course, Davidson does not

think that causation is a relation between statements
it is an relation between events.

-

Rather, Davidson thinks

that in some sentences the word 'cause' does not express
this relation, but instead expresses a relation which holds
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between statements.
Another sort of motivation for thinking that
there
are events, urged by both Kim and Davidson,
is

that events

are needed to state the mind-brain Identity
Theory.

Kim

says that "the Identity Theory asserts that
pain is identical

with brain state B ." 17

a few sentences later he says that

to claim that pain is identical with
brain state B is to

claim, among other things, that the two statements
'Plato
is in pain

(at time t)

(at time t)

state." 1

'

'

and

'Plato is in brain state B

describe or refer to the same event or

if this is what the Identity Theory says, then,

of course, it is true, there are events.

The Identity Theory

is a matter of dispute, however, and so any appeal to
it to

establish that there are events would seem to be weak.
The fact that the theory is disputed might, nevertheless,

be of interest.

For most of the disputants do not chal-

lenge the meaningfulness of the theory, and even those who
deny the truth of the theory do not do so on the ground
that there are no events.

This suggests that those phil-

osophers who discuss the Identity Theory uniformly agree
that there are events.

This fact might provide some

evidence for thinking that there are events, but it is
surely only meager evidence.

Davidson makes a different, but related, claim.

He

says that not merely the truth, but the intelligibility
of the Identity Theory requires that there be events.

19
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But this does not seem to be right.

Suppose that the

central claim of the Identity Theory can be
put as 'All
mental events are identical with physical
events'. Surely
this claim would be intelligible even if
there were
no

events.

We could imagine two misguided biologists
dis-

agreeing over whether all yellow alligators are 20-

chromosomed alligators.

Even though there are no yellow

alligators nor 20 -chromosomed ones, let us suppose,
the

disputed claim is still intelligible.

Perhaps, however,

Davidson meant to assert instead that the central claim of
the Identity Theory is non-vaccuous

'

.

If the Identity

Theory is non-vaccuous or non-trivial, then whether it is
true or false

events

.

,

it would seem to follow that there are

This consideration would have to be worked out

in greater detail to be really convincing, but it is,

I

believe, a promising line of argument.

A final consideration in favor of an ontology of
events is suggested by Davidson's remark that "it is hard
to imagine a satisfactory theory of action if we cannot

talk literally of the same action under different des-

cnptions

.

"

20

And he adds that "this talk of descriptions

and redescriptions makes sense, it would seem, only on the

assumption that there are bona fide entities to be des-

cnbed and redescribed."

Davidson's claim gets its

force, presumably, on the assumption that if there are

actions, they are events, and so if there are actions,
there are events.

I

think that this latter claim is
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correct, although

I

am not sure how convincing Davidson's

claim is, that a satisfactory theory of actions
requires
that we be able to describe and redescribe the

same action.

But the question of what is to count as a satisfactory

theory of action is a question that is beyond the scope
of
this work
We have listed eight reasons for thinking that there
are events.

One

I

found weak, namely, that events are

needed to account for adverbial modification.

Another,

that events are needed for explanation, is puzzling;

Kim and Davidson, who make the claim, turn out to hold
views about explanation and events that make it difficult
to see how events are related to explanation.

reasons,

(i)

Four

that we have definite descriptions purporting

to denote events, more generally,

(ii)

that we have

singular terms which purport to refer to events and which
come equipped with what looks like the whole apparatus of

reference,

(iii)

that we need events to give a theory of

action, and (iv)

that the non-triviality of the Identity

Theory shows that there are events, seem to be right,
but by themselves they are likely to be unconvincing.
reasons seem to me to be promising.

Two

First, events are

needed to give the semantics of sentences like
(1)

John's kicking the door startled me.

Second, events are needed to give an account of causation,

since the relation of causation holds between events. 22
.
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Although none of the philosophers we considered
advanced
the first of these as a reason in favor
of events, it is

clear that they would all be sympathetic to it.

For, Kim,

Davidson, and Chisholm all regard phrases like 'John's

kicking the door' as referring to events.

It is also

clear that they all regard the second reason as persuasive.

Kim and Davidson have even attempted to state

causal theories in terms of their theories of events. 23

Showing exactly how these considerations establish that
there are events, if indeed they do, would presumably

require having an acceptable theory of causation and an

acceptable semantics for English in hand.

Of course,

investigating these areas is beyond the scope of this
work.

turn instead to a consideration of problems

I

which any adequate theory of events ought to provide
answers to.

Problems

2.

answer

,

I

think

,

.

An adequate theory of events ought to

the question of whether there are both

particular and generic events.
important?

I

Why is this question

think it is important because an adequate

theory of events should be useful in stating a theory of

causation.

But, as Kim has emphasized,

24

causation, con-

strued on a Humean model, seems to require both generic
and particular events

.

Central to a Humean account of

causation are the requirements that causes and effects
be constantly conjoined and that they be spatially and

temporally contigious.

If particular events occur only
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once, it makes no non-trivial sense
to say that they are
constantly conjoined. So the
requirement of constant
conjunction seems to require generic events:
every instance
of generic event A is followed by
an instance of generic event B.
On the other hand, spatial-temporal
contiguity seems
better explained in terms of particular
events, since they
seem more readily locatable. So it seems
as though a
theory of events ought to embrace both
generic and particular events, or otherwise explain how a theory
of causation
can be stated with only one or the other.
As a matter of fact, the three theories
we have ex-

amined each have an answer to this question.
most straight'-forward.

Kim is the

For Kim, events are particulars.

But those properties the exemplifying of which
by a thing
at a time is an event are generic events.
Thus, according
to Kim, each particular event has a generic
event built
in.

For Davidson events are particular.

While he does not

deny that there are in addition generic events

parently does not feel a need for them. 25

,

he ap-

How can

Davidson state the principle of constant conjunction?
1

think he would do so as follows

:

if an event e causes

an event f then there is a predicate

predicate

*

G

'

'F*

true of e and a

true of f such that all F-events are followed

by G-events and all G-events are preceded by F-events. 25

There may be a difficulty in deciding exactly which pre-

dicates non-trivially support causal generalizations, but
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there seems to be no reason in principle
that would prevent
the condition of constant conjunction
from being stated
in some such way as the above.
On Chisholm's view events are generic.

And while he

does not deny that there are particular
events, he thinks
that we can do without them, in the sense
that we can

reduce talk which seems to be about particular
events to
talk just of the occurrence and non-occurence
of generic
events.
How than can Chisholm explain the spatial-temporal

contiguity of causes and effects?

Well,

(generic) events

may occur at different times and at different
places, and
it is particular occurrences of events which
cause parti-

cular occurrences of other events.

If a particular oc-

currence of an event £ causes a particular occurrence
of
an event

g_,

then those occurrences of
£ and q are spatially

and temporally contigious

.

Of course, on Chisholm's theory,

there are strictly no such things as particular occurrences
of events.

But if he can successfully eliminate talk of

particular occurrences of events in terms of the occurrence or non-occurrence of events, then the way

I

just

stated the principle of spatial-temporal contiguity can be

purged of any references to particular occurrences.

I

am

not sure that Chisholm can carry out this enterprise, but
if he can, he would not be barred on this account from

giving a theory of causation. 2 7
•

•

A second problem which any theory of events ought to
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solve is whether there is recurrence, and if there
is not,

what we mean when we say that a certain event occurred

yesterday and the same event occurred again today.
Chisholm's theory is designed to accommodate recurrence.
Kim and Davidson must say that, literally, there is no
such thing.

Kim can give a round-about account of some

kinds of recurrence.

For example, if someone were to

suggest that John's sleeping recurred, Kim could say that
there are times t
t

and t

2

exists,

2

±

1

,

2

,

and

is earlier than t

[(John,

t_

3

)

,

t_

3

3

cuch that t

is earlier than

and that [(John,^), sleeps]

sleeps] exists, but [(John, t

sleeps] does not exist.

2

)

,

What literally recurs on this

account is John's sleeping sometime, but that, for Kim,
is not an event.

And if someone were to suggest that

there being a Republican President recurs, Kim can say

that there exist distinct people x and y and times t^
and
[Y

,

such that

t_

2

t

2

)

,

[

(x,

t^)

,

is a Republican President]

is a Republican President] both exist.

and

In this

case what literally recurs is someone's being a Republican

President, and again, that is not, on Kim's view, an event.

Davidson considers the following example of recurrence
"last night

I

dropped a saucer of mud, and tonight

again (exactly the same thing happened)

.

"

I

did it

He tries to

account for two occurrences of his dropping a saucer of mud
solely in terms of particular events.

He suggests that

"the sum of all my droppings of saucers of mud is a par-
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ticular event, one of whose parts (which
was a dropping
of a saucer of mud by me) occurred
last night; another such
part occurred tonight. We need three
events to carry this
off, but they have the same ontological
status .” 29 Suppose that Davidson only dropped a saucer
of mud
twice.

It

is not clear how his suggestion can
make literal sense of

the claim that there is one event, namely,
Davidson's

dropping a saucer of mud, and it occurred exactly
twice.
It will not do to say that there are exactly
two events
which are Davidson's dropping a saucer of mud, for
that
does not say that there is an event that occurred twice.

Nor will it do to say that there is an event, namely, the

sum of Davidson's droppings of a saucer of mud, that has

exactly two parts.

For in the first place, it is not

clear that anything has exactly two parts.

If Davidson's

individual droppings of a saucer of mud had parts, are
not those parts also parts of the sum-event consisting of
the two droppings?

Perhaps there is something involved in

the process of forming sum-events which ensures that the

only parts sum-events have are the particular events in

which they consist, but Davidson has said nothing to suggest
this.

But even if clear sense could be made of the sug-

gestion that there are exactly two parts to the sum of

Davidson's droppings of a saucer of mud, this would not
treat literally that his dropping a saucer of mud occurred
twice.

But if this claim is not to be taken literally,
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then Davidson might just as easily say
that he dropped a
saucer of mud twice. This latter statement
does not require any events other than particular events
for its

analysis.

This is in fact a line that Davidson takes,
or
\

comes close to taking, in a later paper.

^

Thus, if

Davidson accepts as literal claims that there are
events
that recur, then he seems to be unable to explain
re-

currence.

If, however, he could show that such claims

need not be taken literally, then he need not be
trouble
to try to expalin recurrence.

A third problem for any adequate theory of events is
that it ought to make sense of our ordinary intuitions

about how events are individuated.
able

It would be unreason-

of course, to think that a philosophical theory ought

to mesh perfectly with our pre-analytic intuitions.

For

one thing, our intuitions are not always that clear.

But

it is certain that we do not ordinarily conceive of events
as so fine-grained as Kim and Chisholm do.

I

also think,

though perhaps this is not as clear, that we do not ordinarily conceive of events as so coarse-grained as Davidson
does

.

First, let us consider the fine-grained approach.

Consider some event, say, Washington's crossing the
Delaware. 31

None of Kim's events is identical with that

event, since it seems to be the case that none of Kim's

events could have occurred at any time other than the
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txme at which they did occur.

But, of course, Washington's

crossing the Delaware could have taken

a

little longer.

Also, intuitively, Washington's crossing
the Delaware was
the same event as the man who would
become the first

President crossing the Delaware.

And it was the same

event as Washington’s crossing the Delaware on
Christmas
night.

But according to Chisholm, those events which
are

Washington's crossing the Delaware, the man who would
become the first President crossing the Delaware, and
Washington crossing the Delaware on Christmas night, are
all distinct.

So none of them is that event which we

would ordinarily have in mind when we speak of Washington's
crossing the Delaware.
It seems as though the theories of events given by

Kim and Chisholm do not have to do with the things we ordinarily think of as events
battles
events.

,

weddings

,

,

things like examinations

football games

,

and births

Perhaps this is of no consequence.

,

or blessed

But if they do

really mean to give a theory of events, then if the entities
they describe are not what we ordinarily think of as events,
then they at least owe us an explanation of how our ordinary events are related to their preferred entities.

One

possibility is that our ordinary events might somehow be
constructed out of the preferred entities of Kim's or
Chisholm's theory. 32
that might be done.

But as of now we have no idea how
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While Kim and Chisholm present theories
with an abundance of events, Davidson's theory
seems not to have enough.
Judith Thomson notes that there is a
moderate view between
Davidson’s view on the one hand and views
like Kim's
and

Chisholm's on the other.
But there is, between them, a "middle
ground",
according to which we may not identify a replenishing with a pumping, but may, and indeed should,
identify a replenishing with a replenishing by
pumping, and that with a replenishing with a
pump;
according to which we may not identify a killing
with
a shooting with a pressing of a trigger,
but may,
and indeed should, identify a killing with a killing
by shooting, and that with a killing with a
gun; and
so on.
If

the view sketched by Thomson reflects our preanalytic

view of events, and

I

suspect that it does, then Davidson,

too, has to explain how the entities he prefers are
re-

lated to our ordinary events.

Where Kim and Chisholm face

the task of event construction, Davidson seems faced
with
the task of event dismantling.

I

would guess that the

latter enterprise is at least as formidable as the former.

A final problem for any theory of events is to explain
how sentences that are somehow about events are in fact
related to events.
(8)

Let us call sentences like

John sang at 3:00 P.M.

which "report" an event,

'event sentences'.

A point made

convincingly by Davidson 35 is that event sentences usually
contain no singular term referring to an event.

Yet

(8)

is somehow intimately connected to an event, namely, an
(the)

event of John's singing at 3:00 P.M.

A central
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problem for

a

theory of events would seem to be to spell

out exactly how event sentences are related to
the events
they report.

It will be a useful review of the three

theories we have considered if we briefly consider the

solutions they suggest to this problem.

For Kim an event is a structure consisting in the

having of a property (or relation)
sequence of objects) at a time.
(8)

36

by an object (or

Kim would understand

as attributing a property to an object at a time, and

he would therefore take it as describing the event which
is the having of that property by that object at that

time.

That is, according to Kim,

(8)

describes that

event denoted by the following technical expression:

What

(8k)

[(John, 3:00 P.M.), Sings].

(8k)

denotes is the having of the property singing

by John at 3:00 P.M.

And, in general, a sentence des-

cribes an event just in case it attributes a property to
a thing, or a relation to a sequence of things, at a time.

According to Davidson an event is
Although

(8)

if

a

concrete particular.

understood to mean a particular 3:00

P.M., could not report more than one event, a sentence

like

'John sang yesterday* could be true even though John

sang many times yesterday.

For this reason Davidson takes

event sentences to be existential generalizations over
events.
(8d)

Thus, he would analyse
(Ex) (Sang (John

,

x)

&

(8)

as

At(3:00 P.M., x

)

)
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Adverbial expressions (or at least some
of them) are
treated as predicates of events. For
Davidson, then, an
event sentence asserts the existence
of at least one event
of a certain sort, the sort to be
determined by the con-

ditions of the sentence.

According to Chisholm, an event is a state of
affairs
which can occur, can not occur, and can
recur, that is,

occur again after not occurring.

I

am not sure that

Chisholm's theory yields an unambiguous way of
under-

standing

(8)

Certain remarks of his 37 suggest that he

would understand
(8c)

as

(8)

That event which is John's singing occurred at
3:00 P.M.

Alternatively, Chisholm's theory may by taken to treat

(8)

as
(8c“)

I

That event which is John's singing at 3:00 P.M.
occurred

am not sure whether

other lacks. 3 8

(8c)

or (8c') has advantages the

We might note that (8c) and (8c') entail

each other; so whenever one is true, the other is, as well.
We should also note that they say different things.
(8c)

What

says is that John's singing occurred at 3:00 P.M.;

while (8c') says of John's singing at 3:00 P.M. that it
occurred.

If John's singing is distinct from John's

singing at 3:00 P.M., then (8c) and (8c') predicate distinct properties of distinct entities.
view, John's singing

is^

But on Chisholm's

distinct from John's singing at

168

3:00 P.M.

For

the latter can occur whenever John sings,

,

but the former can occur only when John sings at 3:00 P.M.

Despite the uncertainty over whether Chisholm takes
(8)

as

(8c)

or as (8c

1

)

,

we can state a general claim of

his theory: an event sentence expresses a certain state of

affairs, and the sentence is true just in case the state of

affairs occurs.
a

Our question over (8c) and (8c') is not

question about this general claim.

question as to what state of affairs
What

I

Rather, it is a

expresses.

(8)

have tried to do in this chapter is, first,

to cull from the writings of Kim, Davidson, and Chisholm,

some reasons for taking events seriously.
all of their reasons were convincing,

some are credible.

I

And while not

think that at least

Thus, there is, it seems to me, good

reason for trying to give a philosophical theory of events.
Secondly,

I

have listed four problems which a theory

of events ought to solve.

The three theories we considered

are sophisticated enough to have readily available answers

for three of these problems.

38

The fourth, that of re-

lating a philosophical theory of events to our ordinary

intuitions about events, seems to be less amenable to

straightforward treatment on any of the three theories
considered.

Thus, in addition to the particular criticisms

of the three theories made in previous chapters

,

the lack

of a solution to this problem is a further criticism.
I

think that it is clear that none of the theories we
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considered is at present acceptable.

Whether any of them
\

can be revised or elaborated so as to meet
these criticisms remains to be seen.

I

have tried to evaluate these

theories largely on the basis of clarity, internal
consistency, and correspondence with intuition.

It may yet

turn out, however, that the final test for a theory
of

events is fruitfulness, that is, usefulness in stating

other philosophical theories, most notably, theories of
causation or of the semantics of English sentences
But that is another topic.
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Notes to Chapter VI
The example is due to Terence Parsons

English, Ch. 10

(unpublished).

that actions are similar to
2

,

A Semantics for

He claims that the phrase

consisting of the first four words
taken to refer to an action.

,

of, (1)

is naturally

It appears to be his view

but not a species of, events.

"The Individuation of Events" in N. Rescher, ed.,

Essays in Honor of Carl G

„

Hempel (Dordrecht, 1969)

:

216-

234, p. 217.
3

"Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events" Nous

349, p.
4

(1971): 335-

336.

’’Events and Their Descriptions: Some Considerations"

in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel
5
6

5

,

198-215, p. 204.

"The Individuation of Events" 218.
,
letter
to Fred Feldman, June 14, 1973; also, seminar

at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, spring, 1973.
7

point

For helping me to appreciate the importance of this
I

8
9

op

am indebted to Terence Parsons
.

cit

.

"Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of

Event" Journal of Philosophy 70
10

11
12

(1973)

:

217-236.

"Events and their Descriptions" 210.

letter to the author, February 22, 1974.
"Causal Relations" Journal of Philosophy 63 (1967)

691-703, p. 703.

^"The Individuation of Events"

22 3.

:

171
14

Cf.

"Events and Their Descriptions" 204.

15 loc.

cit

16 See his

.

"Causal Relations" 702.

17 "On the
Psycho-Physical Identity Theory" American

Philosophical Quarterly
18 Ibid

(1966)

:

227-235, p. 231.

.

19 "The

2Q Ibid

3

Individuation of Events" 218.
.

217.

21 Ibid.

218.

^^This remark should not be taken as implying that the

relation of causation holds only between events.

It might,

for example, hold between agents and events.
23 For

Kim see "Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the

Concept of Event",” for Davidson see "Causal Relations".
2

^"Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of

Event" 217.
25 "Eternal vs.
^6

27

Ephemeral Events" 335.

"Causal Relations" 699f.

Cf.

Attempts to state clearly the difference between

particular and generic events have convinced me that the

distinction is not as easily drawn as one might initially
suppose.

I

have been led to speak of events as either

particular or generic because the philosophers we have
considered have used these terms.

It might turn out,

however, that no clear sense can be given to the distinction.

Should that happen, the first problem for any

theory of events should be replaced by the following
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related claim: an adequate theory of events ought to
be
a theory of those entities between which the
relation of

causation typically obtains.
28

29
30

31

"Events and Propositions" Nous

Ibid

.

4

(1970): 25-32, p. 27.

28.

"Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events" 338f.

Let us suppose

,

...

despite history, that Washington's

crossing the Delaware on the night of December 25, 1776,
was his only crossing.
32

This possibility is suggested by Kim,

Physical Identity Theory" 232, note
33

"On the Psycho-

8.

Thomson is actually concerned to trace

Davidson's view and Goldman's view.

a

view between

Goldman's theory is

quite close to Kim's, and it is similar to Chisholm's
theory in the respect that is relevant here, that is, it
sees events as fine-grained.
34

(1971)
35

"Individuating Actions" Journal of Philosophy 68
:

774-781, p. 780

See, for example,

.

"Causal Relations"; also "The

Logical Form of Action Sentences" in N. Rescher, ed.

Logic of Decision and Action (Pittsburgh, 1966)
36

I

:

,

The

81-95.

shall not here review the restrictions Kim places

on the sorts of properties and relations the having of which
by a thing or sequence of things is an event.
I,

Sections

1

and

3.

^"States of Affairs Again" 185.

See Chapter
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38

Although, what

I

said in the last two paragraphs of

Chapter V, Section 6, suggests that taking

(8)

as

(8c')

would be preferable to taking it as (8c).
39

This is not to suggest that their answers
are all

acceptable.

I

am merely suggesting that the theories
each

have the resources to try to state answers to
these problems.
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